

## Chapter 12

# The Security Costs of NMD Deployment

The mission of the proposed US National Missile Defense (NMD) system, as stated in the National Missile Defense Act signed by President Clinton on 23 July 1999, is to defend “the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).” In this context, “accidental” and “unauthorized” refer primarily to Russia, while “deliberate” refers to China and to other potentially hostile states (e.g., North Korea, Iran, and Iraq) that might acquire a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) armed with nuclear or biological warheads.<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of an NMD system is to reduce the risk to US citizens of large-scale death and destruction. This is a critical mission, but it can be achieved only if the decision to deploy such a system would not trigger reactions by other states that, on balance, would result in increased risks to the United States. In short, the gains in security must exceed the losses.

Previous chapters have examined the security benefits of the proposed NMD system: its ability to protect the United States against a small number of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear or biological warheads. We have concluded that the proposed system would not provide an effective defense if the attacker employs relatively simple countermeasures, such as submunitions and balloons, which are well within the technical capacity of any country able to build long-range ballistic missiles.

In this chapter, we consider how states are likely to respond to the deployment of the proposed NMD system and how these responses would affect the

security of the United States. Below we examine, in turn, the potential reactions of Russia, China, emerging missile states, and other states.

### Russia

Russia’s strategic missile force is the only sector of the former Soviet military complex that retains anything like its Cold War capability. Today, Russia deploys over 1,000 strategic missiles armed with more than 5,000 warheads.<sup>2</sup> Russia will place a high priority on maintaining this force as its only credible deterrent against the military power of the United States, an eastwardly expanding NATO, and China. Although Russia’s nuclear forces are expected to decline, with or without continued progress in negotiated arms reductions, Russia is expected to be able to maintain a force of 3,000-4,000 warheads through at least the next decade (see Chapter 2).

The planned NMD system, with up to 250 interceptors, obviously would not be able to protect the United States from a Russian attack involving even 1,000 warheads. One might therefore conclude that the system would not threaten the Russian nuclear deterrent. But Russian military planners, like their US counterparts, will consider scenarios in which their retaliatory capacity might be limited by enemy attacks. For example, Russia will consider the possibility of US nuclear attacks against its nuclear forces. Today, only a small fraction of Russia’s nuclear forces are

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<sup>1</sup> As discussed in Chapter 2, a Chinese accidental or unauthorized launch is not currently a concern because China deploys its long-range missiles without fuel and with the warheads stored separately.

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<sup>2</sup> “START I Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, as of 1 July 1999 as compiled from individual data submissions of the Parties,” available online at the State Department website at [www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/wmd/nuclear/start1/startagg.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/wmd/nuclear/start1/startagg.html). Includes 756 ICBMs armed with 3,560 warheads and 440 SLBMs armed with 2,272 warheads.

positioned to survive such an attack—perhaps only tens of missiles carrying fewer than 200 warheads.<sup>3</sup> Russia would also be concerned about the possibility of US attacks intended to destroy Russia's ability to command its nuclear forces.

A US surprise attack might seem inconceivable. Any use of nuclear weapons would probably be preceded by an extended crisis and conventional combat, so that Russia would have ample time to alert its nuclear forces and improve their survivability. But Russia is likely to worry that a crisis could lead to rapid and highly effective conventional attacks by superior US or NATO conventional forces against Russian bombers, ports, and submarines at sea. Or it might be reluctant to alert its forces for fear of worsening the crisis or triggering preemptive attacks. Even if it did alert its forces, Russia might be concerned that the United States would exploit gaps in its early-warning system to launch an attack that could destroy much of its strategic forces. In any case, the proposed US NMD system looms much larger when measured against the relatively small Russian force that might survive US attack and be capable of retaliation.

Russia will also consider the possibility of the NMD system being expanded far beyond current proposals. As described in Chapter 3, the proposed system includes numerous ground-based radars and satellite-based infrared sensors, giving the United States the nominal capability to track thousands of Russian warheads with high accuracy. Once this sensor system is deployed it would be relatively easy for the United States to field hundreds of additional interceptors and greatly expand the capacity of the system. This concern is currently addressed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which imposes strict limits on the location and capabilities of radars to prevent either country from providing a base for a nationwide defense.<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, Russia may worry that the United States could expand the capacity of its NMD very rapidly by using NMD sensors to increase the range and capability of theater missile defense systems, particularly such as the planned Navy Theater-Wide system. Although

the United States has provided assurances that it will not deploy these systems "in numbers and locations so that these systems could pose a realistic threat" to Russia's strategic nuclear force,<sup>5</sup> this system is highly mobile and the total number of interceptors planned is very large (more than 600). And as a recent BMDO report on the potential utility of the Navy Theater-Wide system to the NMD mission acknowledges, the NMD system's X-band radars could support the Navy Theater-Wide interceptor in engagements against long-range strategic missiles.<sup>6</sup> The report concluded that integrating the planned Navy Theater-Wide system into the planned ground-based NMD system would result in a more flexible and robust national missile defense.

Finally, Russia may have concerns about even the nominal purpose of the proposed NMD system. Because the system is intended to protect the United States against accidental and unauthorized attacks, it must be designed to destroy at least a few Russian warheads.<sup>7</sup> Russia might view this as an attempt to deny its ability to use or threaten to use one or a few missiles against the United States. Although it is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which limited Russian attacks would make sense, we have little doubt that Russian attack plans include such options and that Russian planners would seek to preserve them.

Because of these considerations, it is highly likely that Russia would adjust its nuclear force posture in response to the deployment of the planned NMD system. Even if Russian leaders could be convinced that US intentions were benign and that the proposed NMD system would not threaten Russian security, Russian pride and prestige would be at stake and there would be enormous political pressure to respond militarily.

Russia could respond in several ways. First, Russia could equip its missiles with a variety of counter-

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<sup>3</sup> Russia reportedly averages one regiment (nine single-warhead missiles) of mobile missiles out of garrison and one or two ballistic-missile submarines (16 to 36 missiles armed with 64 to 264 warheads) on combat patrol at sea. Harold Feiveson, et al., *The Nuclear Turning Point* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 109.

<sup>4</sup> Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, "How a Limited National Missile Defense Would Impact the ABM Treaty," *Arms Control Today*, November 1999, pp. 7-13.

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<sup>5</sup> "Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures Related to Systems to Counter Ballistic Missiles Other Than Strategic Ballistic Missiles," 26 September 1997, available online at the State Department website at [http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/missdef/abm\\_cbm.html](http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/missdef/abm_cbm.html).

<sup>6</sup> Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea-Based Assets to National Missile Defense" 1 June 1999.

<sup>7</sup> According to US officials, the planned NMD system "would also provide some residual capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch of strategic ballistic missiles from China or Russia" (Jacques S. Gansler, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition And Technology, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittees on Research and Development and Procurement, 25 February 1999).

## Russian Statements on NMD

It is difficult to over-estimate the ABM treaty's "tremendous significance as a factor of strategic stability and international security.... Implementation of existing plans for deployment of national anti-missile defense systems would constitute a violation of fundamental obligations under the ABM treaty—not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of national territory—and will lead to actual abolition of the treaty. Such a development would inevitably upset the whole system of international treaties in the disarmament field, it can trigger a new round of a strategic arms race including in outer space, and undermine the existing non-proliferation regime."

—**Vasily Sidorov, Russian Ambassador to UN Conference on Disarmament**

("Russia and China Warn of New Arms Race in Space," Reuters, 5-11-99)

"[T]he very direction of the current actions of the US Senate is in itself a step towards destroying the ABM Treaty and with it all agreements on limiting strategic missiles.... [The ABM Treaty and START Treaties] are composite parts of an integral whole.... We are talking here of a serious threat to the whole process of limiting nuclear weapons and to the stability of a strategic situation which has taken decades of international agreements to build up."

—**Russian Foreign Ministry Statement**

(*Agence France Presse*, 3-18-99 and *Reuters*, Moscow, 3-18-99)

"... all agreements that have been signed or are being prepared will come under threat—namely START I, START II, and consultations on START III."

—**Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces**

(Barry Renfrew, "Russia Fears US Proposal Could Lead to Arms Race," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 10-19-99)

"We will fully withdraw from all inspection measures and will not let anyone close to our arms. Russia will not know what is going on in the United States. Americans will not know what is going on in Russia."

—**Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces**

("Russia Warns of US Arms Race," Associated Press, Moscow, 10-5-99)

"Problems have cropped up now with the Russian-American 1972 ABM treaty; for this reason, we are forced to build in into our new missiles a capability for penetrating anti-missile defenses."

—**Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces**

("But We Make Missiles," *Izvestia*, 6-5-99, p. 1)

If the United States deploys a missile defense system, Russia "will be forced to raise the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear armed forces and carry out several other military and political steps to guarantee its national security under new strategic conditions. ... We see no variants which would allow the United States to set up a national ABM system and still preserve the ABM treaty and strategic stability in the world."

—**Gregory Berdennikov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Security and Disarmament Department**

(David Hoffman, "Moscow Proposes Extensive Arms Cuts," *Washington Post*, 8-20-99, p. 29)

measures (decoys, chaff, jammers, etc.), to ensure that its warheads could penetrate the NMD system with high probability. Indeed, recent statements indicate that Russia plans to deploy countermeasures on its Topol-M ICBM in response to the planned NMD system.<sup>8</sup> While such countermeasures would not make the Russian

nuclear arsenal more dangerous or lethal, they would negate any protection the NMD system otherwise would have afforded against accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized Russian attacks.

Second, Russia could rely more heavily on its ability to launch its missiles on warning of an attack. Because only a small fraction of the Russian nuclear force could survive a US attack, Russia reportedly maintains an option to launch most of its vulnerable

<sup>8</sup> David Hoffman, "Russian Rocket Called Invincible," *Washington Post*, 25 February 1999, p. 19.

missiles—silo-based ICBMs, garrisoned mobile ICBMs, and pierside submarine-launched ballistic missiles—on warning of attack. This is particularly dangerous given the fragmentation and degradation of Russia's attack warning system, the generally poor state of military training and morale, and the potential for a serious political crisis. Deploying an NMD system would only reinforce Russian plans to launch its missiles on warning. Thus, on balance, deploying an NMD system could actually *increase* the risk of accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized launch.

Third, Russia could maintain a larger number of ballistic-missile warheads that it otherwise would have. Although Russia's economic difficulties preclude a major missile-building program, Russia could maintain a much larger number of warheads at relatively low cost by renouncing the START II Treaty (which it has signed but not ratified), which prohibits multiple-warhead land-based missiles. Russia could, for example, extend the life of its existing large, multiple-warhead ICBMs or fit its newer land-based missiles with multiple warheads. As we discuss in Chapter 2, Russia can likely maintain 3,000 to 4,000 strategic warheads for the next decade or more.

Fourth, Russia could emphasize alternative means of delivering nuclear weapons. For example, Russia could rehabilitate its strategic bomber force, or it could redeploy long-range land-attack cruise missiles on ships or submarines. (All US and Russian nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles are currently in storage as a result of coordinated US and Russian unilateral reductions of nonstrategic weapons in the early 1990s.) This option is less likely than those presented above, given Russia's historical emphasis on land-based ballistic missiles, but risks to US security could increase if Russia goes down this path. These forces are more vulnerable to theft or unauthorized use than are ICBMs, which are under tight central control.

Finally, Russia could deploy an NMD system of its own, partly for reasons of parity and prestige. Although many analysts would dismiss this possibility, given Russia's economic situation, Russia's experience with missile defense is comparable to that of the United States, and it would be able to deploy an NMD system at a cost far below that of the planned US system. Russia almost certainly would use nuclear-armed interceptors in such a system, which would have a higher kill probability and would be less susceptible to countermeasures than the hit-to-kill interceptors planned by the United States. Although a Russian NMD system would not threaten the United States directly, it

undoubtedly would trigger US countermeasures and Russian counter-countermeasures that would renew the nuclear arms race and leave both countries less secure. The ABM Treaty's prohibition on nationwide defense was intended to prevent this sort of action-reaction syndrome.

In addition to its effect on Russia's nuclear force posture, a US NMD system would affect US-Russian relations more generally. The Clinton administration's stance on missile defenses and the hostile or dismissive attitude towards Russia expressed by factions in the US Congress has strengthened xenophobic forces in Russia. A US decision to deploy an NMD system, whether accompanied by US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or by exploiting Russia's weak position to compel its agreement to treaty modifications that are contrary to its interests, is bound to lead to a deterioration of US-Russian relations. It can be expected that reactionary forces in Russia would use this issue to advance their agenda.

A deterioration of relations could curtail or reverse cooperative efforts to reduce nuclear risks. This could include failure to implement the START II Treaty and the collapse of the START process, renunciation of unilateral agreements to reduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and termination of a variety of existing assistance programs, officer exchanges, transparency measures, and inspection arrangements. Russia's massive stockpile of nuclear materials, weapons, and delivery systems and its numerous scientists and engineers with expertise in sophisticated military technology will continue to pose a risk of proliferation of both materials and expertise to other countries as long as Russia's economy remains poor and its political climate turbulent. A deteriorating US-Russian relationship would preclude the cooperation essential to reduce this proliferation risk, which poses a vital threat to US security.

A deteriorating US-Russian relationship could also make Russia more willing to sell missile components, missiles, and countermeasures to emerging missile states, resulting in an increased missile threat to the United States from other countries. Indeed, as the 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) notes, the likelihood that China or Russia would transfer an ICBM to another country in the next 15 years depends in part on their "perceptions of US ballistic missile defenses."<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> National Intelligence Council, "National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): Foreign Missile Development and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," unclassified summary, September 1999, p. 12.

## Chinese Statements on NMD

"If a country, in addition to its offensive power, seeks to develop advanced TMD or even NMD, in an attempt to attain absolute security and unilateral strategic advantage for itself, other countries will be forced to develop more advanced offensive missiles. This will give rise to a new round of arms race, and will be in nobody's interest... After the Cold War, with the world moving rapidly towards multi-polarity, the significance of ABM Treaty has increased rather than decreased."

—**Ambassador Sha Zukang, Director-General,  
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China**

(Statement at Carnegie Endowment  
7<sup>th</sup> Annual International Nonproliferation Conference,  
Washington, D.C., 1/11–1/12/99)

"Any amendment, or abolishing of the [ABM] treaty, will lead to disastrous consequences. This will bring a halt to nuclear disarmament now between the Russians and Americans, and in the future will halt multilateral disarmament as well."

—**Ambassador Sha Zukang, Director-General,  
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China**

(John Pomfret, "China Warns of New Arms Race,"  
*Washington Post*, 11-11-99, p. 1)

"Progress in nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved without a global strategic equilibrium and stability. The research, development, deployment and proliferation of sophisticated anti-missile systems and the revision of, or even withdrawal from, the existing disarmament treaties on which global strategic equilibrium hinges will inevitably exert an extensive negative impact on international security and stability and trigger off a new round of arms race in new areas, thereby seriously obstructing or neutralizing international efforts of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation."

—**Chinese President Jiang Zemin**

(Speech at Conference on Disarmament,  
Geneva, 3-26-99)

"This decision [to proceed with plans for ballistic missile defenses] will have profound negative influence on the global and regional strategic balance and stability and trigger a new round of arms race to the detriment of the international disarmament process."

—**Li Changhe, Chinese Ambassador  
to the UN Conference on Disarmament**

("Russia and China Warn of New Arms Race in  
Space," Reuters, 5-11-99)

## China

As discussed in Chapter 2, China deploys some two dozen single-warhead silo-based missiles and one submarine capable of carrying ballistic missiles. China has no intercontinental bomber force. It does not maintain its strategic nuclear forces on alert, ready to launch on short notice. Thus, China does not have a truly survivable deterrent force, as that concept is understood by the other nuclear powers. China apparently believes that ample warning of an attack would be available and that the mere possession of nuclear weapons, together with the fact that an attacker could not be confident that it could destroy all of China's weapons and prevent retaliation against one or more of its cities, is sufficient to deter nuclear coercion by the United States and Russia.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of China's nuclear doctrine, see Alistair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 5–42; Yang Huan, "China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons," *Defense Industry of China, 1949–1989*

Given the size and the vulnerability of China's strategic nuclear forces, any concerns that might be aroused in Russia by a US NMD deployment would hold far more strongly for China. Although a nation that possesses a thousand nuclear warheads for delivery by long-range missile might tolerate the planned NMD system, a nation with two dozen warheads is highly unlikely to do so. Moreover, while the Clinton administration is seeking to assure Russia that the planned NMD system would not threaten the Russian nuclear deterrent, the system is designed and intended to be able to defend against an attack by tens of missiles, which is the size of China's ICBM force. It is reasonable to expect that China would respond to the deployment of an NMD system so as to maintain, in the eyes of US political

(Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 1989), available at [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/huan.htm](http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/huan.htm); and Paul Godwin and John J. Schulz, "Arming the Dragon for the 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," *Arms Control Today* (December 1993), p. 6.

and military decision makers, the deterrent capability of China's nuclear forces.

In fashioning its response, China has two basic options: deploying countermeasures or increasing the size of its nuclear force by deploying more missiles and/or deploying multiple warheads on missiles. A launch-on-warning posture is not a realistic option for China because it has no attack warning system and because even a full-scale Chinese attack would be unable to overwhelm the proposed NMD system unless China also employed countermeasures or increased the number of warheads. Given China's historical emphasis on ballistic missiles, it is also unlikely that China would develop alternative means of delivery, such as long-range air- or sea-launched cruise missiles.

We believe that a buildup and modernization of China's ICBM force is a likely consequence of a US decision to deploy NMD. China may already plan to modernize its force to improve its survivability and lethality, but the timing and scale of the buildup would almost certainly be affected by a US NMD deployment. If, as seems likely, China's strategic arsenal would remain significantly smaller than those of the United States and Russia, a buildup would not materially alter the existing strategic balance. However, those who believe that the proposed NMD would fundamentally shift the strategic balance in favor of the United States, freeing the United States to act with impunity against China's perceived vital interests, are engaged in wishful thinking. China has the resources, knowledge, and incentive to maintain a credible strategic deterrent into the foreseeable future, and there is every indication that it will do just that.

To maintain an ability to increase the size of its arsenal, China may refuse to agree to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. China may also fail to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, particularly given the rejection of that treaty by the US Senate, or may even resume nuclear testing in order to develop countermeasures to the NMD system or warheads for multiple-warhead missiles.

As with Russia, US deployment of an NMD system would strain US-China relations. Because the United States needs China's cooperation in limiting missile proliferation, a deterioration in US-China relations may also lead to an increased missile threat from other countries.

### Emerging Missile States

The primary mission of the NMD system is to defend US territory against a small number of ICBMs armed

with nuclear or biological warheads launched by emerging missile states, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. As discussed in previous chapters, any such state could employ one or more effective countermeasures to defeat the NMD system if it wanted to use long-range ballistic missiles. Here we consider other possible responses that an emerging missile state could take to an NMD system. Several of these are elaborated in Chapter 2.

One possibility is to use ship-launched cruise missiles to deliver a nuclear or biological weapon. As the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has disclosed in considerable detail, the United States does not have anything approaching a reliable defense against ship-launched cruise missiles.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the Rumsfeld Report noted that cruise missiles have a number of characteristics that make them increasingly attractive to emerging missile states.<sup>12</sup> Today dozens of developing nations own tens of thousands of conventionally armed anti-ship cruise missiles, which could be converted to land-attack missiles and armed with a small but deadly payload of biological agent.<sup>13</sup> It would be easier to develop or acquire short-range ship-launched cruise missiles with a large enough payload to deliver a nuclear weapon than it would be to develop or acquire ICBMs.

Another reason a nation might choose to use cruise instead of ballistic missiles is the difficulty of establishing the identity of the ship from which a cruise missile was launched with sufficient confidence to permit retaliation. There are over 100,000 merchant ships with a displacement of over 100 tons, and every day about 1,000 such ships cross into the area of the Atlantic Ocean within 1,000 miles of US shores. Low-flying cruise missiles are difficult to detect and track. By contrast, the launch point of any ballistic missile, whatever its range, would be identified by US satellite sensors.

A second alternative is to launch short-range ballistic missiles from ships off the US coast—a possibility that is mentioned in both the Rumsfeld Report and the 1999 NIE. Any state that could deploy an interconti-

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<sup>11</sup> R. Ritter, National Cruise Missile Defense Briefing, May 1998.

<sup>12</sup> Executive Summary, *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, July 1998, p. 2. Referred to hereafter as the Rumsfeld Report. The summary is available online on the Federation of American Scientists website at [www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm).

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, David M. Gormley, "Hedging Against the Cruise Missile Threat," *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1998), pp. 92–111.

mental-range ballistic missile would be capable of launching shorter-range missiles from ships at a much earlier date. Ship-launched ballistic missiles could reach large portions of the continental United States on trajectories immune to interception by the planned NMD system or air defenses, and such missiles could be considerably more accurate than an ICBM.

A third possibility is to use covert delivery methods, such as sailing a merchant ship into a harbor, using civilian aircraft, or smuggling a weapon into the United States. As the 1999 NIE notes, such delivery options would be more reliable and accurate than ICBMs deployed by emerging missile states and would probably “be more effective for disseminating biological warfare agent than a ballistic missile.”<sup>14</sup> In addition, a first-generation nuclear weapon may be too large and heavy for delivery by a long-range ballistic missile available to an emerging missile state, but would be suitable for delivery by ship, truck, or airplane. And because an emerging missile state would likely have only a few nuclear weapons, it would want a reliable means of delivery.

In short, ICBMs are not required to attack the United States with nuclear or biological weapons. For developing countries in particular, ship-launched cruise or ballistic missiles or clandestine delivery present a far easier and surer road to such a capability than do ICBMs.

Proponents of NMD agree that other modes of delivery are possible, but they maintain that this does not negate the value of an NMD system. Deploying an NMD system would, however, exact an opportunity cost. Defense spending is limited; spending money on one thing means that money will not be spent on something else. If, as seems likely, deploying an NMD system would preclude the large expenditures required to defend against non-ICBM modes of delivery, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that an attacker would choose one of these alternative modes, then an NMD system would leave the United States more vulnerable to attack.

### Other States

The effects of a US decision to deploy an NMD system would reverberate throughout the international system. For example, if China responds by building up its nuclear force, this could trigger the deployment of

nuclear-armed missiles by India and, in turn, Pakistan. Similarly, a decision by China to reject a fissile-material cutoff or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would preclude participation by India and Pakistan and would doom these agreements.

If the deployment of a US NMD system resulted in a halt in US-Russian arms control efforts and a Chinese buildup, as seems likely, this would undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. States that agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) did so under the condition, in Article VI of the treaty, that the nuclear weapon states would pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapons states reiterated this commitment in connection with the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995. The first post-extension review of the treaty, scheduled to take place this year, is expected to focus almost exclusively on the extent to which the nuclear weapon states are meeting their Article VI commitments.

Even key US allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, are uneasy about US plans to deploy a national missile defense. European leaders have reportedly told US officials of their concerns that deploying NMD would decrease international security by prompting Russia and China to pull out of arms control treaties. They have also warned that it would complicate relations within NATO.<sup>15</sup> (See box on Allied Statements on NMD.)

### Conclusions

The proposed US NMD system would decrease the security of the United States. Russia and China would respond to the deployment of such a system by deploying a greater number of warheads than otherwise planned. In addition, Russia would likely increase its reliance on launch-on-warning to ensure that any retaliatory strike would be large enough to overwhelm the NMD system. A decision to deploy an NMD system would also have a generally negative effective on US relations with Russia and China and would threaten cooperative efforts to decrease the number of nuclear weapons, improve controls on weapons and weapon materials, and combat proliferation. Finally, an NMD system could prompt emerging missile states to concentrate on other modes of delivery.

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<sup>14</sup> National Intelligence Council, “NIE: Foreign Missile Development,” p. 15.

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<sup>15</sup> See, for example, William Drozdiak, “Possible US Missile Shield Alarms Europe,” *Washington Post*, 6 November 1999, p. 1.

## Allied Statements on US NMD Plans

"If you start this [NMD], you're starting the arms race back up."

—**NATO official**

("A Case of the Jitters," Paul Bedard,  
*US News & World Report*, 12-13-99, p. 12)

"If only one side, the United States, begins to step up [defense capabilities], a Cold War atmosphere will be created."

—**Jonathan Motzfeldt, prime minister of  
Greenland's home rule government**

("Greenland Says Russia Must Back US Missile Plan,"  
Reuters, Copenhagen, 11-3-99)

"Great care should be taken not to damage a system that, for almost 30 years, has underpinned nuclear restraint and allowed nuclear reductions."

—**Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian  
Foreign Affairs Minister**

("Canada Stuck in Nuclear Squabble," Mike Trickey,  
*The Ottawa Citizen*, 11-17-99, p. A13)

"The Americans are obviously prepared to take advantage of Russia's present weakness to realize their own national interests.... America's current arms policy is nothing less than an affront: The ABM treaty is being called into question, spending for the NMD anti-missile system is being more than doubled. This means that Russia is no longer accepted as a partner in security policy. And this thoughtlessness on Washington's part hurts Russia's self-esteem, which ultimately only strengthens the nationalists and national communists.

—**Gernot Eler, Deputy Chair of the  
SPD Group in the German Bundestag**

(*Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*, 2-5-99, p. 8)

"We already went through this debate during the 1980s with Ronald Reagan and the idea of a 'Star Wars' anti-missile system. We learned how dangerous and divisive it can be when you tamper with the ABM treaty, and that is one thing that has not changed since the end of the Cold War."

—**Senior NATO official**

("Possible US Missile Shield Alarms Europe,"  
William Drozdiak, *Washington Post*, 11-6-99, p. 1)

"This project destabilizes the present situation. By questioning the ABM Treaty, we are moving directly from non-proliferation to counter-proliferation.... But where are the potential aggressors? Why should rogue states not be persuaded by the logic of deterrence?... Might this system not trigger a new arms race, raising the risk of proliferation in unstable regions of the world?... We would like this project to be studied quietly, and without any premature decisions. But it concerns the whole world."

—**Gen. Jean-Pierre Kelche,  
French chief of defense staff**

("French Army Chief Rejects Washington's  
Fears of a NATO Split," Carey Schofield,  
*London Daily Telegraph*, 11-23-99)

"We must avoid any questioning of the ABM treaty that could lead to disruption of strategic equilibria and a new nuclear arms race."

"If you look at world history, ever since men began waging war, you will see that there's a permanent race between sword and shield. The sword always wins. We think that these systems are just going to spur swordmakers to intensify their efforts."

"China, which was already working harder than we realized on both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for them, would of course be encouraged to intensify those efforts, and it has the resources to do so. India would be encouraged to do the same thing, and it, too, has the resources. And it would also increase tensions within NATO, which would be too bad."

—**French President Jacques Chirac**

("US and NATO Allied Divided Over Defense Needs,"  
Craig R. Whitney, *New York Times*, 12-3-99, p. A6,  
and "With a 'Don't Be Vexed' Air, Chirac Assesses  
US," Craig R. Whitney, *New York Times*, 12-17-99)

"We are worried the Americans are going to ruin the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, and then the whole deck of cards would tumble down."

—**European defense official**

("Europe Disputes Need for Ballistic Missile  
Defense," Colin Clark and Luke Hill,  
*Defense News*, 12-13-99, pp. 3, 28)