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Nuclear Reactor Access Zones
Nuclear power plant security warranted considerable attention following the September 11th attacks. Rather than tout strengths or decry vulnerabilities, this issue brief merely attempts to provide the foundation for a better understanding of the ongoing debates.

09/14/2004 
Testimony to Congress on Nuclear Plant Security (PDF)  This testimony to the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, and includes a review of the steps the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has taken to enhance security measures since September 11, 2001.

08/04/2004
Statement at NRC public workshop on Nuclear Plant Security(PDF) These comments were made by Dave Lochbaum to express the frustration at UCS with three years of NRC policy that kept public in the dark and out of the discussion on Nuclear Plant Security measures.  They also show our hope that this public workshop will be a first important step forward in engaging the public stakeholders.

05/12/2004 
Presentation to NRC about access to sensitive information and background checks (PDF) 
This is a brief collection of slides that explore the changing rules for workers at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants and their Access to Sensitive Unclassified Homeland Security Information (SUSHI).  It also looks at the changes in rules around public access to NRC information.

04/28/2003 
Petition to NRC seeking protection against Aircraft hazard
UCS and Mothers for Peace (MFP) petitioned the NRC for a rulemaking to provide better protection against radiological sabotage at U.S. nuclear power plants.

04/08/2003 
Issue Brief on the aircraft threat to nuclear plants
This backgrounder provides information about the potential security threats for nuclear power plants caused by air attacks like suicide bombing and the NRC’s Operational Safeguards Readiness Evaluation (OSRE) process.

03/18/2003 
Testimony to U.S. Congress about design basis threat level for nuclear plants (PDF)
This testimony was brought before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations to address concerns about the design basis threat (DBT) level.  The key is ensuring that there are no shortfalls in the protection provided by nuclear plant owners up to the DBT level and in the security measures taken by the federal government above it.

03/10/2003 
Testimony to U.S. Congress on nuclear plan security (PDF) 
Dave Lochbaum presented this testimony on "Emerging Threats: Assessing Public Safety and Security Measures at Nuclear Power Facilities" for the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations.  He addressed issues including force-on-force security tests, background checks, and weapons training.

01/24/2003 
Letter Proposing industry consultant with security clearance represent UCS in NRC's closed-door security meetings (PDF)
This letter was an attempt to address the exclusion of UCS and other public stakeholders from NRC's policy discussions because of security concerns.  UCS asks in the letter that Paul Blanch, who had previously been cleared for safegaurds information, be allowed to represent the concerns of UCS at public meetings and congressional hearings that were closed to those without security clearance.

11/19/2002 
Presentation at American Nuclear Society conference on nuclear plant security (PDF)
This presentation offers a good outline of security issues and public information in relation to NRC since 9/11.

6/10/2002 
Joint letter with Nuclear Control Institute to NRC recommending resumption of public meetings on security  (PDF)
After the events of 9/11 NRC suspended public meetings on nuclear security.  UCS and NCI wrote this letter together to urge the Commission to set up a system for interim public security meetings and eventually re-instate routine public meetings.

04/08/2002 
Presentation to NRC about nuclear plant security (PDF)
This presentation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission displays the loss of trust in the security process of the Commission and makes suggestions for improved testing and public interaction.

03/11/2002 
Formal petition to NRC seeking better protection from electrical grid sabotage (PDF)
UCS petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue orders to nuclear power plant owners to take measures to reduce the risk from sabotage of irradiated fuel. These measures included imposing a 72-hour operation limit under certain onsite power conditions, and imposing a minimum 24-hour time-to-boil for spent fuel pool water.

12/04/2001 
Issue Brief illustrating concepts of nuclear reactor access zones
Nuclear power plant security warranted considerable attention following the September 11th attacks. This brief goes through some of the different terms associated with security areas at nuclear power plants.

10/16/2001 
Issue Brief on Spent Fuel Security
This illustrated backgrounder provides a valuable introduction to spent fuel, spent fuel containment structures, and spent fuel security issues.

10/01/2001 
Issue Brief on Nuclear Plant Security
The information in this backgrounder goes through the basics of nuclear reactor security from dangers, regulations, and testing, through current problems and possible solutions.

09/04/2001 
Letter on proposed evaluation system for force-on-force security tests (PDF)
This letter details UCS support for a proposed approach for determining the significance of findings from force-on-force security tests at nuclear reactors.

04/13/2001 
Letter expressing concern about security guard working hours and their deterrent capability (PDF)
After a nuclear power plant security guard was fired for refusing to work overtime, UCS sent this letter to NRC asking NRC to investigate issues of worker fatigue among plant security guards especially in realtion to 10 CFR Part 26—fitness-for-duty requirements.

02/21/2001 
Letter recommending solutions to insider threat of nuclear plant sabotage (PDF)
This letter conveys the concerns of UCS and other organizations about the design basis threat (DBT).  Primarily these concerns relate to the size and tactics of an intruding force and the response of nuclear plant security personnel.

01/05/2001 
Letter on insider threat of nuclear plant sabotage (PDF)
This letter articulates UCS's concerns about the simulation of insider threats and the recognition of additional targets.

10/20/2000 
Letter on proposed changes to force-on-force testing of nuclear plant security (PDF)
This letter offers an outline of the points of concern that UCS has about the characteristics of the force-on-force tests of plant securtiy.

07/14/2000 
Letter on the proposal to have owners self-test their security capabilities (PDF)
UCS and others are concerned that the nuclear industry is not ready to switch from the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program to self-policing.

 

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