This symposium marked the beginning of an ongoing effort by the Union of Concerned Scientists to engage Chinese scientists in a program of cooperative research focused on the technical aspects of space security. The goal of the program is to lay a solid technical foundation for future discussion between China and the United States of arms control measures designed to preserve outer space as a sanctuary for peaceful civilian, military and scientific activity.



Abstracts

David Wright: Technical Issues of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons

A key issue of interest in the space security debate is the vulnerability of satellites to attacks that are intended to disrupt their ability to function usefully. Such attacks may cause temporary, reversible disruption of the satellite’s operation or may damage the satellite or related equipment permanently. In this talk, I will discuss briefly some technical issues related to several types of kinetic-energy ASATs—those intended to disrupt a satellite in space by hitting it with a mass at high speed. This discussion will begin by looking at sub-orbital ASATs and how the effectiveness of these systems depends on the level of technology of the country using the ASAT. I will also look at the ASAT capability of the planned U.S. missile defense system, and the vulnerability of space-based missile defense interceptors to attacks by ground-based ASATs. 

Du Xiangwan: Contamination in Space from the Perspective of Scientific Ethics

Space is the common inheritance of humankind. Several international legal agreements have been signed and implemented to protect this inheritance. Although there is no international legal agreement that specifically prohibits the stationing of weapons in outer space, or the conduct of tests and experiments of these weapons in space, obligations incurred under existing law suggest state are obligated to insure their activites in space preserve the environment for use by others. Contaminating space with debris from weapons tests, deployments will contaminate space and could limit or inhibit the peaceful uses of space for scientific and economic development.

Lewis: Current U.S. Programs and Funding
 
What are the prospects for space weaponization? The question is particularly important as the world approaches what promises to be a bruising   2005 NPT Review Conference. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) remains deadlocked while the United States reviews its support for the fissile material cut-off treaty. Although the 2000 NPT Review conference identified thirteen practical steps to demonstrate good faith in the commitment to pursue disarmament, the declared nuclear powers are unlikely to make progress on these steps before the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Preventing the weaponization of outer space is not explicitly one of the thirteen steps to demonstrate good faith in nuclear disarmament. The vision of expanded military activities in outer space articulated by the Bush Administration, however, draws heavily on the outline of the Nuclear Posture Review and has complicated efforts to build consensus for a work-plan in the CD. The publication of several U.S. military documents outlining these new military missions in outer space, including the 1998 Space Command Long Range Plan and the United States Air Force’s biennial Strategic Master Plan, have resulted in considerable criticism of the United States, particularly from the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Concern over U.S. military activities in outer space has contributed to the deadlock in the CD and may complicate the NPT Review Conference.

Broad policy documents, such as the Strategic Master Plan, do not, however, indicate which programs will survive the thicket of political, technological and budgetary hurdles. Documents such as the Strategic Master Plan and Transformation Flight Plan are largely wish-lists designed for the budgeting process.  The requirements set by such documents are typically optimistic and subject to alteration, particularly by the United States Congress. Identifying the programs likely to reach operational testing and deployment requires a careful examination of the documents produced to support the President’s annual budget request and the authorization and appropriations bills passed by Congress.

Of the many force projection and space control programs, which are the most likely to tested and deployed in the next few years? Based on an analysis of the fiscal year (FY) 2004 and 2005 Budget requests, the two most important programs, for opponents of space weaponization, are (1) space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and (2) micro-satellites capable of "autonomous proximity operations"—orbital maneuvers that would allow satellites to inspect, service and intercept other satellites.

Richard Garwin: Overview of Technical Issues

This is an introduction to technical issues of performance and vulnerability that must be overcome for space weapons to be effective and competitive with ground or sea-based systems for the various roles of attack on targets on the ground, in the air, or in space. Some of the analysis builds on " Space Weapons, Earth Wars ", and on work done in the course of a Council on Foreign Relations study of space weapons. The discussion includes aspects of boost-phase intercept of long-range missiles as published in 2003 by the American Physical Society study team.

Qiu Yong: Analysis of Space-based Missile Defense

This talk will introduce the content on space-based missile defense, including key concepts, a brief histroy, some key technical issues, and its latent ASAT capability.

Zhong Jing: The Use of Space Power in the Iraq War

Space assets are important force multipliers that can have a significant and potentiall decisive impact in the conduct of modern warfare. This paper analizes the use of space assets, including communication, position and imaging satellites, in the conduct of the recent war in Iraq. The paper argues that space-based assets improved the U.S. ability to quickly identify objects in the battlespace, the ability to target, attack and evaluate hostile forces and the ability to provide on-demand logistical support to forces in the field. These improvements greatly accelerated the pace of the conflict, and enabled U.S. forces to achieve a revolutionary improvement in the speed and effectiveness of their convential warfighting capability.

Andre Rothkirch: The Effects of Nuclear Explosions and Kinetic Weapons as Space Weapons

The United States plans to develop and deploy missile defense systems consisting partly of space-based components. U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and official statements about a need to deploy defensive space weapons have stimulated an international debate on a possible arms race in space as well as the necessity of new space arms control measures. We will give a presentation on technological aspects of potential space weapons. The presentation will cover the use of a nuclear explosion as an anti satellite weapon (ASAT) as well as a model for estimating achievable altitudes and velocities of rockets (combined with an additional 'payload assumption'). The model results obtained will be used to give an idea of the technical capabilities needed to potentially threaten specific numbers and types of satellites.

Li Bin: How U.S. Space Weapons Would Change Chinese Nuclear Deterrence

The research will discuss how U.S. plans for space-based weapons could effect Chinese nuclear capabilities and the course of Chinese nuclear modernization. Based on a worst-case assumption that assumes the technologies considered can perform their assigned tasks, our initial calculations show that 33 space-based interceptors are needed to kill one ICBM in the boost-phase. Using an economic model to calculate the relative costs of offense and defense, our initial reserach suggests that China can achieve adequate gains in the ability to penetrate space-based defenses for significanty less cost than the U.S. must expend to counter those gains with increased deployments of additional interceptors.

Laura Grego: Space Surveillance and Verification

Safe operation of satellites requires knowing where the other space objects are and where they’re moving. The velocities characteristic of earth orbit are very high and hence collisions, with even a very small particle, can devastate a spacecraft.  By the same token, purposeful interference with a satellite also requires knowing where the satellite is and how it is moving.   The knowledge about where (and what) satellites and debris are and their likely trajectories is called space "situational awareness". Space situational awareness is generally achieved with "space surveillance," the monitoring of objects in space by observations of either their emitted or reflected radiation. I will discuss the different uses for this information and what that implies for the design of the surveillance systems, current capabilities (with a focus on the U.S.), and the challenges for using space surveillance to verify space arms control agreements.

Huang Hai: Dynamical Modeling and Simulation of Orbital Debris

With the development of space technology, especially the appearance of manned spacecraft i.e. spaceship and space station, the problem of orbital debris is increasingly concerned by aerospace engineers and scientists. As the relative velocity between space debris and spacecraft usually comes up to a few kilometers per second or even higher, a fatal damage can be raised if a spacecraft is impacted by debris even with very small mass. Therefore the space debris is threatening the safety of the man-made spacecraft. Although collision possibility between debris and spacecraft is still lower so far, with the increasing aerospace activity of human beings, including military use of satellite technologies and potential anti-satellite weapons, the situation may become worse and worse if no action is taken.

This paper introduces some progress in computer simulation for the hypervelocity impact problem of space debris. The final purpose the work is to make clear the effect and damage patterns of the space structure when impacted by orbital debris. The hypervelocity impact case taken from a reference and having the experimental result, is first simulated with several methods with software LS-Dyna. The SPH (Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamics) method is finally verified as the best way to simulate the problem through comparing the results obtained with different methods. The suggested SPH method is then used to simulate various hypervelocity impact cases with different fragment shapes, impacting angles, layers of objective plates. The animated simulation procedures of impact are presented, which provides the phenomena of collision between spacecraft and debris. The results of the work can used to predict the impact damage, as well as the technical supports to necessity of space security and non-weaponization.

Wang Ting: Research on Collision Probability between Debris Clouds and Spacecraft

The looming space arms race troubling people working in global arms control is discussed. The methodology for determining orbital debris and micrometeoroid impact probabilities of spacecraft is reviewed. The authors introduce a new algorithm for calculating collision probability between a satellite and a debris cloud, which is actively released and its distribution arranged in a given form. The accuracy of orbit determination, prediction and maneuver of debris cloud is also considered. The algorithm is helpful to evaluate the destructive effects of a space-based kinetic weapon. A specific example is presented to illustrate that the satellite vulnerability and the dangers of triggering a new arms race in space.
        
Chen Shenyan: A Review of Research on Orbital Debris Simulation Software

Some worldwide popular engineering software, which can numerically simulate the hypervelocity impact, as well as their applications in high- and hyper-velocity impact are introduced. The most practical and valuable software is suggested given the present shielding design of spacecraft in China. Moreover, several problems in numerical simulation of hypervelocity impact are presented based on this software.

George Lewis: Security Implications of Satellite Miniaturization

Satellite technology is spreading to an increasing large and diverse group of nations. Much of this spreading is occurring via the increasing availability and capability of relatively small, light and inexpensive satellites. Some in the United States, and in particular in the current Bush Administration, argue that this development poses a potential threat to U.S. security, with the use of such small satellites as anti-satellite weapons the most commonly cited threat. I believe that this potential threat, while not non-existent, has been greatly exaggerated by those arguing for expanded U.S. military activities on space. This talk will review the current state of the small satellite field, and attempt to assess the extent to which such satellites pose a security threat, with an emphasis on identifying questions for further research.

Jonathan McDowell: Military Space and Public Transparency: Independent Analysis of Space Activities

Since the early 1960s, the work of independent observers of world space activities has significantly contributed to public understanding of space exploration and especially military use of space. I will review the ways in which independent (non-government) researchers monitor space activities, give some examples from the history of the Soviet space program, and comment on the contribution of independent analysis to establishing confidence in international space security.

Joan Johnson-Freese: U.S. Attitudes Toward Space Cooperation

Space is increasingly perceived as a strategic asset. Subsequently, achievements by one country are often viewed as threatening, and zero-sum, by another. The October, 2003, launch of the Shenzhou V was a significant achievement by China, which will undoubtedly result in significant re-posturing by other space-faring countries, particularly the United States. The United States has three possible options for future cooperative manned spaceflight projects. It can continue to exclude China from cooperative space efforts but hope to continue working with other countries; commence a new manned-spaceflight race; or initiate an inclusive cooperative space effort, with the incremental inclusion of China. The interests of the U.S. space program and of the nation would be best served by inclusive cooperation. However, there are both political and legal obstacles which stand in the way. The basis for those obstacles stem from perceptions regarding Chinese intentions in the aggressive pursuit of a multidimensional space program and consequent U.S. reaction. This paper explores those issues, and possible options for the United States and other countries in future cooperative space ventures.