Contents

The Russian Threat

 

De-alerting Proposals

by James Goodby and Harold Feiveson

by the National Academy of Sciences

by Bruce Blair

Conclusion

Sources

		in global security   Helsinki Summit   The START Process

This small piece of information, largely ignored by the popular press, has brought new hope to arms control activists who wish to de-alert strategic nuclear forces in the United States and in Russia. As defined by Bruce Blair, a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, de-alerting means: "taking steps that increase the amount of preparation time needed to launch nuclear weapons" (3). It is "a stance of zero alert in which no weapons are poised for immediate launch" (2). In de-alerting, legally and technically reversible steps are added to the process of launching a nuclear missile or other nuclear weapon. Such steps lengthen the nuclear fuse, and increase the time needed to launch a nuclear strike. De-alerting is also a transparent process of information-sharing between former rivals, and could lead to greater multilateral cooperation on arms control issues. While de-alerting itself does not permanently cut the nuclear arsenal, it creates a stable framework to facilitate further arms reductions by deactivating nuclear weapons.

De-alerting goes further in preventing the launching of a nuclear attack than does detargeting. President Clinton is fond of noting that for the first time, no Russian missiles are aimed at US targets. This is true, and it is a nice first step in the move towards disarmament, but it is a step that could be easily reversed. Nuclear-armed missiles can be retargeted in a matter of seconds, so that an agreement to detarget is largely symbolic. De-alerting would move to extend the time needed to prepare nuclear weapons for launch by hours, days, or weeks (3). Doing so could prevent small conflicts or misunderstandings from falling prey to the nuclear hair trigger and erupting into nuclear war. De-alerting would provide time for cooler heads to prevail. As stated by Bruce Blair, de-alerting would work to improve US-Russian relations by reducing tensions; promoting stability; enhancing safety, safeguards, and security; supporting traditional arms control; and saving money (3).

The Russian Threat

The vulnerability of these strategic weapons to a first strike, coupled with a deteriorating early warning system, has led Russia to pursue a policy of launch on warning. Bruce Blair has highlighted the deterioration of Russia's early warning systems, noting that two or more satellites, out of a total of nine, in Russia's early warning satellite network are out of commission. Only three of its nine large phased-array radars are functional. In addition, Russia lost seven radar installations in the breakup of the Soviet Union: the radars now sit in independent countries (3). A study by Germany's Peace and Conflict Research Foundation, released in August 1997, found that problems with early warning systems have led to nuclear weapons being kept in permanent states of alert (6).

This large-scale degradation of early-warning systems has increased Russia's hair-trigger posture. In the event of an attack, Russia's leadership would normally have between fifteen and thirty minutes to decide how to respond to the attack. The deterioration of Russia's early warning system may be reducing the time that Russian planners have to make the launch decision. As the window of response time continues to shrink, Russia has moved to rely increasingly on launch on warning (3).

The problems facing the Russian leadership in the event of a first strike are immense. First, a significant part of their nuclear arsenal is stationary and could be annihilated if the launch command were not sent out before impact of US warheads. Thus, only a relatively small Russian retaliatory strike could be launched. Second, they have less time to make the decision to launch due to a faulty early-warning system. One solution is to rely on launch on warning, thereby ensuring that a full retaliatory strike could be launched before impact of enemy missiles. This policy, however, has serious shortcomings.

To the West, the idea that NATO or the United States would today launch a preemptive nuclear strike against Russia is ludicrous. But to the Russian generals, whose job it is to be conservative and to plan for any contingency, such a possibility must be taken seriously. Russian strategic planners do not believe enough of their forces could survive a first strike to then launch a retaliatory strike. A posture of launch on warning means it will be easier for Russia to launch nuclear weapons upon warning of a crisis. However, it also increases the threat of an unauthorized or accidental launch. A classified CIA report claims that the ability to launch missiles lies not only with the President, but with regional command posts and submarine captains (15). The report claims that missiles in launch-on-warning posture are capable of being launched without codes from the central command. Thus, the chances of a rogue commander launching a missile increase, as do the chances of a missile being launched accidentally.

The danger of a launch-on-warning policy is illustrated by an event that occurred on January 25, 1995, when an atmospheric research rocket launched from Norway triggered a full-scale alert in Russia (16). Russia, which had been warned of the launch, nonetheless mistook the research rocket as a sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launched from the Norwegian Sea. President Yeltsin and his commanders had begun the process of activating the launch codes before they realized the rocket was harmless.

Two other troubling developments came to light in February 1997. The first occurred when Ivan Rybkin, the Security Council chief, said that Russia would use nuclear weapons first, as part of a "decisive reply," if faced with an overwhelming conventional attack (13). This sentiment was both echoed and clarified in May by the deputy head of the Security Council, Boris Berezovsky, who said in a radio interview with Echo Moskvy: "We are not speaking of making a first strike in order to secure advantage, but if we are driven into a corner and are left with no other option, we will resort to nuclear weapons" (13). While this was a significant change in Russian nuclear posture, it actually brought Russia in line with US policy. The United States has always refused to adopt a formal no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons, despite a no-first-use pledge by then-Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev.

The most startling statement on the state of Russia's nuclear force came in February 1997, when Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov questioned his country's nuclear command and control ability: "If the shortage of funds persists, the system could fall apart. Russia may soon approach a threshold beyond which its missiles and nuclear systems become uncontrollable" (15). More than a few eyebrows were raised by this statement, though both Russian and US officials rushed to defend the state of Russia's nuclear controls. US Secretary of Defense William Cohen reiterated his belief that Russian strategic forces are in secure control (10). He postulated that Rodionov's comments were made in an attempt to gain more funding for the defense department. Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin completed an inquiry in the wake of the comments and concluded that "the nation's nuclear shield is in reliable hands" (4).

Despite these reassurances, on the eve of an official visit to the United States by Mr. Rodionov, the CIA report detailing the breakdown of Russian nuclear command and control was leaked to the press (9). The report stated that malfunctions in the command and control architecture spontaneously switched nuclear missiles to "combat mode" on more than one occasion. This switch to combat status "would not necessarily result in an unauthorized missile launch," but it does seem to back up Rodionov's original claim (9). By beginning to de-alert strategic forces, the complete breakdown of Russian nuclear control can be prevented.

De-alerting Proposals

James E. Goodby and Harold Feiveson

In Ending the Threat of Nuclear Attack, James E. Goodby and Harold Feiveson put forth a three-staged approach to de-alerting (12). The approach would be advanced by the United States and would be open to all nuclear weapons states. The core principle of this proposal is that all parties accept the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent force and, if necessary, as a retaliatory force against first use of such weapons. Each of the three stages could be completed in five-year time frames. The first stage of their proposal could not only be completed before the first stage of the Helsinki agreement is implemented, it could provide more comprehensive reductions. The authors admit that this plan does not abolish nuclear weapons, but it takes meaningful steps in that direction: "the longest steps that can be realistically projected under current international conditions."

Stage 1

1. Reaffirmation by the United States and Russia of all the terms of the ABM Treaty.
2. Reduce nuclear arsenals to 2,000 deployed warheads. This reduction would be enacted by 2005 rather than 2007, as suggested in the Helsinki agreement. These levels could be reached by reducing the number of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from START II levels of five hundred to three hundred, by decreasing the number of warheads on Trident II SLBMs from five to four, and by reducing the number of ballistic missile submarines from START II levels of fourteen to ten. Russia could comply by reducing its silo-based single-warhead ICBMs (the SS-18) and mobile ICBMs (the train-mounted SS-24 and the truck-mounted SS-25), its strategic bomber force, and its Delta ballistic missile submarine force.
3. Shift most strategic nuclear weapons away from reliance on rapid-launch procedures. This would force both the United States and Russia to abandon reliance on a policy of launch on warning for strategic forces. Nuclear warheads for strategic bombers could be stored in bunkers at separate airstrips and would be subject to inspection by the other government. In times of crisis, bombers would be allowed to fly to the bunker airstrips to be armed with the nuclear warheads. This process would add anywhere from hours to days to the realerting process and could be easily observed by opposition forces.

   Warheads from silo-based ICBMs could be removed and stored at separate sites, much like the storage of warheads for strategic bombers. Goodby and Feiveson believe that this action could take months to fully reverse and would also be transparent to the opposition.

   Mobile ICBMs and SLBMs could be similarly de-alerted. From submarines in dock for long periods, the warheads, guidance and control modules, or shrouds (nose cones) could be removed. The shrouds or warheads of mobile ICBMs in garrison could be removed and stored in separate locations. Should they need to be realerted, secure trucks could transport the warheads to the mobile ICBMs at set locations, keeping the location of the mobile launchers secret.

4. Eliminate nonstrategic nuclear weapons. While 1991 agreements between the United States and Russia eliminated many nonstrategic nuclear weapons, numerous weapons, such as nuclear bombs for tactical bombers and nuclear warheads for sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), remain. Goodby and Feiveson question whether such weapons play a significant role in the current order, but note that their elimination may be difficult. The United States may insist on keeping warheads deployed in NATO countries for symbolic reasons, and Russia may also balk at their eradication.
5. Establish a comprehensive warhead verification regime. This system would require the United States and Russia to divulge the exact number and location of all nuclear warheads. Each warhead would then be assigned an individual serial number for further identification. This action creates a framework for further cuts in forces and verification of dismantlement of warheads in future stages.

1. Reduce the total number of warheads, stored and deployed, to 1,000 each. This could again be accomplished in a variety of ways. The authors suggest the United States eliminate its ICBM force and rely on a force of ten ballistic submarines each armed with sixteen four-warhead Trident II missiles, totaling 640 warheads. The remainder could be stored for a force of twenty B-2s, allowing the B-52 to be eliminated or converted to a conventional role. Russia could eliminate its strategic bomber force and rely on 400 warheads on single-warhead mobile ICBMs and 600 warheads deployed on eight ballistic missile submarines.
2. Dismantle all other warheads under bilateral monitoring arrangements.
3. Place recovered fissile material in internationally monitored storage. The fissile material would be held until it could be used to produce energy or it would be permanently disposed of.
4. Britain, France, and China agree to freeze deployment at or near current levels. They would also agree to exchange data on their nuclear forces, much like the US-Russian agreements in Stage 1.

The United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France in combination, would reduce warheads to a level of 200 each, with most of that number being deactivated. Goodby and Feiveson believe this stage could be completed by 2015-2020. The two believe each country could have as few as ten warheads deployed. This force level would be able to inflict severe damage on an aggressor, but would lack the power to destroy a retaliatory force.

The United States could reduce its warheads as follows: eight ballistic missile submarines could each carry three four-warhead Trident II missiles; and a force of twenty B-2s could be delegated five warheads each. Russia could deploy 12 warheads on each of eight ballistic submarines, 80 warheads on mobile single-warhead missiles, and 24 bombs for a small tactical bomber force.

The National Academy of Sciences

In a recently issued report, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy, the National Academy of Sciences stated that "[e]limination of continuous-alert practices should be pursued as a principal goal in parallel with, but not linked to, START III" (14). The report further calls for increased transparency between the United States and Russia in order to verify compliance and to assure each other that a large-scale surprise strike is not possible. In order to preserve stability, however, a portion of the nuclear force "sufficient to satisfy the core function" must have the capability to endure any attack. The NAS believes that survivability could be ensured by a small force of ballistic missile submarines or mobile ICBMs out of garrison. Outside of this small force, the NAS holds that "the remainder of the force--silo-based missiles, mobile missiles in garrison, missiles on submarines at port, and strategic bombers--can and should be rendered incapable of rapid launch in ways that would be readily verifiable."

Noting the successful de-alerting of bombers in 1991, the NAS suggests several means to de-alert ICBMs, such as: removing the shrouds, warheads, guidance systems, or other key components. Any such attempt at de-alerting should be transparent and easily verifiable by inspectors or remote monitoring devices.

The NAS also states that all nuclear powers "should search for ways to assure each other that all nuclear weapons, including those on submarines at sea or on mobile missiles out of garrison, are incapable of being used quickly and without warning." The NAS notes that some solutions have been offered, such as having submarines patrol outside the range of their targets, but finds that this issue should be further studied in detail. Nonetheless, the NAS report does embrace de-alerting as a realistic goal that should be pursued.

Bruce Blair

Bruce Blair's most recent de-alerting proposal from the forthcoming book on deep cuts, edited by Frank von Hippel and Harold Feiveson, also takes a staged approach (3). Blair's proposal has emerged from comprehensive talks with Russian specialists and uses an equitable and symmetrical approach to

• drastically restrain the most lethal counterforce weapons
• increase transparency, allowing for easy verification
• dramatically cut the number of strategic warheads configured for launch on warning
• create a de-alerted arsenal that would be slow to reverse

Stage 1

1. Russia would remove 400 warheads from SS-18 heavy ICBMs for storage on site or at a separate bunker. Blair estimates these missiles could be realerted at a rate of one missile per day per base.
2. Russia could de-alert the majority of silo-based ICBMs by removing the in-flight guidance batteries and warheads from multiple-warhead missiles or by removing the explosive charges that blow the lids off the missile silos. This would de-alert all silo-based ICBMs save for around 200 warheads based on several regiments of SS-18s. Blair estimates that only a few missiles per day per base could be realerted, and any movement to realert would be observable from space reconnaissance satellites. The United States would be expected to de-alert its MX and Minuteman III forces in a similar fashion.
3. Cut the number of Russian ballistic missile submarines on patrol at sea to two. Blair notes that this is the current deployment force of Russian SSBNs (ballistic missile submarines), though this is largely due to a budget crunch. Russia is unable to afford to send any more SSBNs to sea. This step formalizes this limit.

   The United States would in turn reduce its ballistic submarine force on alert from twelve Trident submarines to six. All 400 of the W-88 Trident warheads, viewed as first-strike weapons by Russia, would be downloaded from American submarines. All other Trident missiles would have the number of warheads cut from eight per missile to four. This action would cut the number of US warheads at sea from 2,000 to 576, with only half that number on full alert.

4. Download all warheads from Russian ballistic missile submarines in port. The warheads could then be stored in bunkers off site. Blair emphasizes the need to remove warheads from SSBNs on 15-minute launch readiness at pierside. Because Russia cannot afford to send all their SSBNs on patrol, they leave them in port, but keep them on alert status, ready to fire in a launch-on-warning posture.

   Likewise, the United States would download warheads from all Trident submarines in port at the Washington State or Georgia submarine bases. Warheads could be realerted at a rate of roughly one per hour per port, and a handful of submarines would be ready in a few days.

5. De-alert the Russian mobile strategic missile launchers. The truck-mounted SS-25 could be cut from the current out-of-garrison force of eighteen to nine. The remainder, which Blair estimates to be around 350 warheads, would remain in garrison. De-alerting could be achieved in a number of ways. Blair suggests disabling the struts that support the missile when it is raised vertically, storing the hydraulic fluid from the erector launcher separately, or removing the warhead or battery from the rocket itself. The realerting of these systems would take anywhere from several hours to several days.
6. Maintain the status quo for strategic bombers. In accordance with the 1991 agreement, strategic bombers are de-alerted. Blair expects that no more than half of Russia's 80 bombers and 800 warheads could be realerted within a week. The United States could realert at a quicker pace, and Blair estimates one bomber per hour could be realerted. Thus, the entire US force of 14 B-2s and 44 B-52s with a total of 1,088 warheads could be realerted within two and one-half days.

Stage 2

1. Britain, France, and China would join the movement to de-alert.
2. All warheads would be removed from US and Russian delivery vehicles and placed in verifiable storage. Blair believes that this action would "end the hazardous rapid reaction postures of the strategic forces exempted from de-alerting during stage one." This action of removing warheads from missiles would add significant time to any realerting process, as Blair estimates it would take a full day to realert a significant number of strategic forces.
3. Strategic bombers would be further de-alerted by having their warheads moved from on-site bunkers to off-site locations. Rather than being able to realert one plane per hour, the United States would now need four hours to realert a bomber. The significance of this action for Blair is that the B-2 and its bunker-penetrating B-61 bomb would be further de-alerted. The B-61 is intended to take out the Russian high command by destroying underground command posts and is seen as a threat by Russia.

Other De-alerting Options from Bruce Blair

1. "Safe" Russian silo-based missiles and US Minuteman III and MX missiles by inserting a pin into the motor ignition mechanism, blocking ignition. This process could be reversed by crews entering the silo and pulling the pin. The entire US silo-based force could be realerted in twelve hours.
2. Remove the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) from US MX missiles. The IMU, part of the MX's guidance system, could be stored on-site. Reinstallation of the IMU takes longer than reversing the "safing" step, and thus the MX force would take 15 hours to realert rather than 10.
3. Force SSBNs to patrol out of the range of their targets. By demarcating a line in the sea that SSBNs are unable to cross save in times of crisis, a great deal of time could be added to the time it takes to launch. Submarines would have to steam for hours to acquire their targets within the range of their missiles.

   Several problems exist with this proposal. Russia may not want to disperse its subs far from its own coast, as they are susceptible to US hunter subs. Another difficulty lies in verification. The deterrent capability of an SSBN depends on its location not being known. If SSBNs were required to report their location for verification, they would give up the element of surprise and become targets for hunter submarines. This would be a particular problem if Russia keeps only two submarines at sea.

4. Remove the guidance systems for Trident missiles and store them on board the submarine. Electronic seals could be used to ensure US compliance. Realerting could be achieved at one missile every three hours; thus the full complement of 24 missiles could be realerted in three days. Russia could not take part in this step, as their missiles are inaccessible from inside the submarine.
5. 5. Rather than remove warheads from sea- or land-based missiles, remove the shroud. This step would be easily verifiable and would be time-consuming to reverse. Blair gauges that the United States could realert 36 missiles per day, so that the entire 580-missile force could be realerted in a little more than two weeks.

Conclusion

Sources

1.

John Barry and Evan Thomas, "A What-If Problem." Newsweek, June 23, 1997, pp. 48-50.

2.

Bruce Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).

3.

Bruce Blair, "De-alerting Strategic Nuclear Forces," from the forthcoming Deep Cuts book edited by Frank von Hippel and Harold Feiveson, June 25, 1997 draft.

4.

Bruce Blair, Harold Feiveson, and Frank von Hippel, "Defusing the Doomsday Machine," not yet published, May 9, 1997 draft.

5.

Bruce Blair and Sam Nunn, "From Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Safety," Washington Post, June 22, 1997.

6.

Clifford Coonan, "Russian Nuclear Weapon Risk Seen Great," Reuters, August 11, 1997.

7.

John Diamond, "US-Russia Nuclear," Associated Press, April 28, 1997.

8.

"France's Chirac Lauds Yeltsin's Warhead Pledge," Reuters, May 28, 1997.

9.

Bill Gertz, "Mishaps Put Russian Missiles in 'Combat Mode,'" Washington Times, May 12, 1997, p.1.

10.

Bill Gertz, "Cohen Confident of Russian Control of Nuclear Missiles," Washington Times, May 14, 1997.

11.

Jason Gertzen, "StratCom Chief Says He Backs Cuts in US Nuclear Arsenal," Omaha World-Herald, July 17, 1997.

12.

James E. Goodby and Harold Feiveson, Ending the Threat of Nuclear Attack (Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, 1997).

13.

David Hoffman, "Yeltsin Approves Doctrine of Nuclear First Use If Attacked," Washington Post, May 10, 1997, p.21.

14.

National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997).

15.

Bruce W. Nelan, "Nuclear Disarray," Time, May 19, 1997, pp. 46-47.

17.

Aaron Tovish, "De-Alerting Fact Sheet," Draft copy.

Tony Taylor wrote this "De-alerting Primer" during his Summer 1997 UCS internship.