In the past months, we’ve talked a lot about the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. As we move forward, we wanted to summarize the Global Security program's concerns about the program and review its status in Congress. The RRW program is designed to develop and deploy new warhead types to replace all the existing weapons in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. It would require an enormous investment in a revived nuclear weapons infrastructure and could make a return to nuclear testing more likely.

Congress is supporting the program and is likely to nearly double the funding for it. The only question is whether the increase will be "fenced," or held back, until studies on the program are provided to Congress.

The good news is that the House has proposed two separate studies that will provide some independent oversight of the Department of Energy (DOE) and the nuclear weapons labs as the RRW program goes forward.

In the coming months, our work will focus on highlighting our concerns about the RRW program and the rush towards it (via increased funding) and seeking to ensure that the House-proposed studies are implemented.

Three Serious Problems with the RRW Program

First, the RRW program is more likely to lead to a resumption of testing than is maintaining the current arsenal. It makes no technical sense to replace well-tested and reliable warheads with untested new designs. The current laboratory leadership claim they can certify a new warhead without testing, but many retired weapons designers and long-term nuclear experts disagree. Given the level of disagreement among experts, there will be tremendous pressure for the United States to test RRWs before they are deployed.

A return to testing by the United States would almost certainly prompt China and Russia to also resume nuclear testing and will make it harder to convince countries like North Korea and Iran to abandon their own nascent nuclear weapons programs. It could also spur India and Pakistan to resume nuclear testing, allowing them to develop more advanced weapons and add them to their arsenal. Resumed testing would also be a serious blow to the non-proliferation regime. The 1995 agreement by the non-nuclear weapon states to make the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) permanent was predicated on a commitment by the nuclear-weapon states to implement a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).

Second, the RRW program implies, by both its name and its nature, that our current arsenal is unreliable or becoming unreliable. This is simply false and contradicts the DOE’s own rigorous certification process that has determined U.S. nuclear weapons to be “safe, secure and reliable” every year for the last decade.

For some audiences, it may be appropriate to stress that the last thing the U.S. military should want to convey to any potential adversary is that the current U.S. arsenal may be unreliable.

Third, the RRW program is the engine that drives a rebuilding of the entire U.S. nuclear infrastructure, at enormous monetary and symbolic cost. Even if the RRW program does not lead to a resumption of testing, it sends a powerful message that the United States plans to keep and improve its nuclear arsenal forever—in contradiction to its obligations under the NPT to seek “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

It is worth noting that Representative David Hobson (R-OH) and others have argued that the RRW program should lead to reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal by allowing for the reduction or elimination of the backup "hedge." However, the DOE makes it clear that substantial reductions in the reserve stockpile will not occur until Congress authorizes, and the DOE implements, a rejuvenation of the entire nuclear weapons infrastructure to create a “responsive infrastructure.” Such a program is much more ambitious than the RRW program and could take decades to complete.

This is the most significant point: the current size of the active and reserve stockpile—nearly 10,000 warheads in total—is determined by an outdated nuclear war fighting plan and targeting policy. A Nuclear Posture Review that accurately reflected U.S. security goals and geopolitical reality should lead to substantial reductions and cost savings today, without the need to design and build new warheads.

Congressional Action To Date

Congress passes two bills that deal with work on nuclear weapons: the Energy and Water (E&W) appropriations bill, which provides funding, and the Defense Authorization bill, which provides direction and oversight.

House Action
The House version of the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) E&W appropriations bill is finished. It provided $52.7 million for the RRW program, an increase of $25 million over the administration's request. The extra $25 million is fenced pending the delivery of a nuclear weapons infrastructure transformation plan to Congress by the National Nuclear Security Agency, the DOE's semiautonomous body that oversees nuclear weapons work.

The bill also requires a peer review study of the RRW designs by JASON Defense Advisory Group to ensure that the two competing W-76 warhead designs developed by the nuclear weapons labs comply with the objectives set out by Congress last year. JASON is an independent scientific advisory group that provides consulting services to the U.S. government on matters of defense science and technology.

The House FY07 Defense Authorization bill is also finished. It funded the RRW program as requested, but directs that if the costly Life Extension Programs (LEP) for the W-80 warhead do not go forward, some of those resources be devoted to the RRW program. However, the House E&W appropriations bill kills the W-80 LEP outright, so if that decision stays, the appropriations bill will trump the authorization bill.

The House Defense Authorization bill also calls for a study by the National Academy of Sciences on the "Quantification of Margins and Uncertainty" (QMU) methodology, which is used by the national laboratories for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. The House report on the bill says "The committee understands the importance of the QMU methodology in establishing a scientific basis for assessing whether the RRW will be able to be certified without underground nuclear testing."

Senate Action
The Senate FY07 E&W appropriations bill has been passed by the full appropriations committee, but is not expected to come to the floor as a free-standing bill. Instead it is likely to be part of a large omnibus spending bill that would not be considered until after the November elections. It provides $62.7 million for the RRW program, an increase of $35 million that comes, the bill says, from the recent Nuclear Weapons Council decision to cancel the W-80 LEP. (This bill was finished after the House bill, so this may be true.) Of the extra $35 million, $10 million is directed for a second design competition for another warhead and the general direction of the Senate E&W language is to speed up implementation of the RRW program.
 
The FY07 Senate Defense Authorization bill is finished. It does not mention the RRW program at all, and therefore provides funding at the requested level of $27.7 million, but does nothing more than that. Again, that funding is trumped by what is in the E&W appropriations bill.

In sum, it looks certain that the RRW program will get additional funds, it is just a question of how much and if anything will be fenced. The House reporting requirements are good, and we will work to support their inclusion in the final bill.