Laura Grego and David Wright
October 13, 2006

The new U.S. National Space Policy was released on October 6, 2006, four years after the Bush administration called for its review.  The new directive replaces the Clinton National Space Policy of 1996, the previous operating document.

Like the 1996 document, the language of the unclassified version of the policy is vague. It does not depart significantly in content from the previous policy document, although priorities have been rearranged, with national security uses of space brought to the forefront and civil space and exploration moved down the list. A few other key changes have been made, as we note below.

Also important is that the current context of the policy differs significantly from 1996, which changes how ambiguities in the wording are likely to be interpreted. The changes in context include a stated interested by the Bush administration in new military uses of space and increased funding for military space programs, as well as a much greater reliance on space assets in the conduct of U.S. military operations, as well as civil applications.

These changes have brought the challenging problem of space security to the forefront. Although the policy document reflects an understanding of the importance of secure access to space and protection of space assets for the United States, it says little about how to achieve this. In particular, it is silent on the most important ways to secure space capabilities, such as ensuring redundancy in satellite systems and the ability to rapidly replace lost space assets or to provide their lost capability with ground and air-based options. 

Moreover, the 2006 Policy claims the right of the United States to “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space” and at the same time to “dissuade or deter others” from developing similar capabilities to deny U.S. access to space, and asserts the right to unimpeded use of space as a U.S. right, not an international right. Other countries will likely object to the idea that freedom of action is a right of a single country. They may also view this directive as legitimizing anti-satellite weapons and could respond in kind. Since the technological barriers to interfering with space assets are relatively low, the U.S. may ultimately find that a situation that relies on unilateral actions offers little assurance. Rather than viewing diplomacy and international agreements as useful tools to advancing U.S. goals in space, the 2006 Policy de-emphasizes the role of these approaches.

The United States, as the dominant actor in space, has the opportunity to lead in establishing laws and customs that will affect the use of space for decades to come, such as rules-of-the-road for space and a ban on the development and testing of destructive anti-satellite weapons. The 2006 National Space Policy is a missed opportunity to do that.

Some of the changes made in the new policy include:

Emphasis on Military Over Civil Uses of Space
In the new document, the national security aspects of space are emphasized over the civil and scientific aspects.

In 1996, the first space policy goal listed was civil (“Enhance knowledge of the Earth, the solar system and the universe through human and robotic exploration”) and the second was military (“Strengthen and maintain the national security of the United States”).

In 2006, the top two goals listed are national security related: “Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives” and “Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there.”

Shifting View of the Right to Use Space
The language in the two Policies about the right to use space has shifted from a statement of a general principle governing all countries to an assertion of a specific right of the United States. This shift can be read as representing an important change in thinking about the U.S. view of acceptable activities in space.

The 1996 Policy states that “The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space.” (emphasis added)

The 2006 Policy states that “The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space.” (emphasis added)

Both versions of the Policy discuss the same four aspects of military space operations, including denying freedom of action in space to other countries, although the 1996 Policy places it in the context of international legal obligations, and, in contrast to the 2006 Policy, recognizes that diplomatic and legal means are also important tools in solving space security conflicts.

In particular, the 1996 Policy states that “DoD shall maintain the capability to execute the mission areas of space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application. …Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and services.”

The 2006 Policy states the goals are to “Maintain the capabilities to execute the space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application missions. …Develop capabilities, plans, and options to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.”

Reduced Role of Arms Control and International Agreements
We noted above that the 1996 Policy states that “Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal or military measures to preclude an adversary’s hostile use of space systems and services.” In addition, the Arms Control section of the 1996 Policy states that “The United States will consider and, as appropriate, formulate policy positions on arms control and related measures governing activities in space, and will conclude agreements on such measures only if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the security of the United States and our allies.”

In contrast, the 2006 Policy states that “The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests…”

This shift is consistent with the current U.S. diplomatic position in the United Nations, both in the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament. The United States has in recent years consistently opposed discussions of diplomatic approaches governing activities in space.

Ballistic Missile Defense
Under the section on Defense Space Sector Guidelines, the 1996 Policy states that “The United States will pursue a ballistic missile defense program to provide for: enhanced theater missile defense capability later this decade; a national missile defense deployment readiness program as a hedge against the emergence of a long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States; and an advanced technology program to provide options for improvements to planned and deployed defenses.”

The 2006 Policy states as a goal to “Provide space capabilities to support continuous, global strategic and tactical warning as well as multi-layered and integrated missile defenses.”

Although the wording in the 2006 Policy is ambiguous, the context for missile defense has changed dramatically since 1996: in July 2002, the United States officially withdrew from the ABM Treaty and has begun fielding components of the Ground-Based Midcourse missile defense system.  Additionally, the Bush administration plans to fund a space-based missile defense testbed beginning in FY2008. In this context, the call in the 2006 Policy for “multi-layered” missile defenses suggests a significant interest in space-based missile defense in addition to space-based sensors.

Call for Nuclear Power in Space
The section on nuclear power in the 1996 Policy is a single paragraph and states that “The Department of Energy will maintain the necessary capability to support space missions which may require the use of space nuclear power systems.”

The corresponding section in the 2006 Policy has been expanded to a page in length, and is much more prescriptive, stating that “Where space nuclear power systems safely enable or significantly enhance space exploration or operational capabilities, the United States shall develop and use these systems.” It is unclear from looking at budget priorities what is behind this increased emphasis. Nuclear power, generally radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) rather than reactors, have long been used in deep space probes and classified national security missions, and this statement may herald an interest in increasing its use for other missions. It may also indicate an interest in moving toward developing reactors for use in space.