| March 23, 2010 |  |
Japan Supports U.S. Declaration That Sole Purpose of Nuclear Weapons Is To Deter or Respond To A Nuclear Attack, Report Finds
Declaration Would Not Undermine Japanese Confidence in The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella, Science Group Says; Administration Should Adopt it
WASHINGTON (March 23, 2010) – The Obama administration is about to release its Nuclear Posture Review, which will guide U.S. nuclear policy for the next five to 10 years. One of the thorniest questions for the panel producing the review is whether the United States should declare that the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter or potentially respond to a nuclear attack by another country.
Japan’s potential reaction to such a declaration has played a major role in the debate. Some U.S. officials maintain that a sole purpose declaration could push Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons. However, according to the findings of a new Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) report, “Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture,” there is considerable support in Japan for such a declaration—and there is strong evidence it would not lead to a nuclear Japan.
“The conventional wisdom in Washington is wrong,” said report author Gregory Kulacki, who traveled to Japan several times over the past year to interview Japanese officials and security experts. “We found strong support in Japan for a U.S. sole purpose declaration. Such a declaration would not undermine Japanese confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella.”
Japan’s present-day allergy to nuclear weapons is consistent with Japanese thinking over the last 40 years. In 1968 and 1995, the Japanese convened official panels to consider the country’s position on developing nuclear weapons, in the context of signing and later extending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Both times the panels concluded that it is not in Japan’s interest to pursue nuclear weapons. UCS has obtained and translated a copy of the official 1995 report, which has never been released. It also has a copy of the 1968 report. (For the reports, go to: www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/nuclear_weapons/policy_issues/japan-america-nuclear-posture.html.)
Some U.S. officials and experts have argued against changes to U.S. nuclear policy because they believe Japan would see such changes as undermining the credibility of extended U.S. nuclear deterrence. The risk of prompting Japan to reconsider developing its own nuclear weapons is high enough, they maintain, that the United States should not adopt a sole purpose declaration. Moreover, they argue the United States should refurbish and extend the life of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the Pacific theater, including the nuclear Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM/N). TLAM/N was taken off deployment in the early 1990s, has been in storage in the United States and is scheduled for retirement in 2013.
This position was reflected in the May 2009 Perry-Schlesinger Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States report, which some administration officials considered to be a starting point for the Nuclear Posture Review. The report called Japan a “potential proliferator.” It stated that a failure to address concerns about extended deterence “could have significant repercussions,” and that “potential proliferation candidates” include “friends and even allies” of the United States. (p. 10)
As a result, the commission recommended keeping “nuclear ambiguity,” rejecting a declaration of “sole purpose.” (p. 37) Moreover, the report stated: “In Asia, extended deterrence relies heavily on the deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on some Los Angeles class attack submarines—the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile/Nuclear (TLAM/N). … In our work as a Commission it has become clear to us that some U.S. allies in Asia would be very concerned by TLAM/N retirement.” (p. 26)
“Some U.S. allies in Asia” clearly refers to Japan. This statement is surprising in part because the Tomahawk is not currently deployed and there are no plans to redeploy it, so it is hard to make the case that deployment of the Tomahawk underpins extended deterrence. (Last month, press reports revealed that the United States has informed Japan that it will retire the TLAM/Ns as planned.)
The commission recommended retaining “capabilities for the delivery of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” The report implies that it was the Japanese government’s official position that “the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk, and to deploy forces in a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand.” (p. 20-21)
Kulacki, a senior analyst with UCS’s Global Security Program, found that the views expressed by the commission and others overstated the risk and, in some cases, misrepresented the views of the Japanese government. Kulacki interviewed a wide range of Japanese officials and security experts, and discovered that they see these issues differently than the commission.
Some of the Japanese officials Kulacki interviewed are concerned about the credibility of extended U.S. deterrence, but their concern is not new and not a result of the current U.S. nuclear policy debate. More important, despite these concerns, the officials and experts he interviewed see Japanese security more broadly than just militarily, and they believe it would not be in Japan’s security interest to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and develop its own nuclear weapons.
This has been the consensus view in Japan for some time. In the course of his research, Kulacki obtained the previously unpublished, official 1995 report by the Japan Defense Agency (now the Ministry of Defense) that supports the same position. This report, written by several conservative Japanese security experts, discusses the thinking behind this consensus.
There is more recent evidence of Japanese thinking that buttresses the findings of the new UCS report. Last December, for example, the Japanese government sent a letter to the United States stating that the testimony four Japanese diplomats gave to the Perry-Schlesinger Commission regarding Japanese nuclear policy did not reflect Japan’s official position. In addition, over the last few months, Japan’s prime minister and foreign minister and more than 200 Diet members have voiced their public support for a “sole purpose” declaration by the United States.
“The fact is, Japanese officials are calling for the United States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons,” said Kulacki. “That should be welcome news to President Obama, who announced that goal during his April 2009 speech in Prague.”
###
The Union of Concerned Scientists puts rigorous, independent science to work to solve our planet's most pressing problems. Joining with citizens across the country, we combine technical analysis and effective advocacy to create innovative, practical solutions for a healthy, safe, and sustainable future.
