| May 13, 2002 Nobel Laureates React to Bush-Putin Arms Agreement
Weapons Experts Decry Keeping Warheads On Hand "President Bush, at the forthcoming Moscow Summit, has the opportunity to reduce two supreme dangers to our security and lives: - The threat that nuclear weapons or weapons usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile states and used as nuclear explosives to destroy American troops abroad or hundreds of thousands of our citizens at home;
- the threat of a massive attack by Russian nuclear-armed missiles due to false warning of a US nuclear strike, which would put at risk the very survival of our nation.
"We applaud the cuts in deployed nuclear warheads that are to be agreed to by Presidents Bush and Putin at the Moscow Summit. But the pace with which the administration proposes to carry out the cuts should be accelerated. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether these cuts will be structured and implemented in a manner that would minimize the threats above. "The serious proliferation threat posed by the Russian nuclear weapons complex will only be reduced if the warheads removed from Russian launchers are placed in secure storage, dismantled and the nuclear materials rendered unusable. President Bush, however, appears to be seeking an agreement that would not compel Russia to make its undeployed warheads invulnerable to proliferation. The administration apparently wants to retain its undeployed warheads in a "responsive reserve force" that could be used to reload bombers and missiles on relatively short notice. An agreement allowing this would, of course, give Russia the freedom to also do as it pleases with its weapons. "The administration argues that the responsive force is needed to address unspecified contingencies in the indefinite future. The deployed force of roughly 2,000 US strategic warheads that would remain after the proposed cuts are completed will, however, more than suffice to meet any threat that can be envisaged. It would be folly to hedge against contingencies that cannot even be foreseen, by taking a step now that would exacerbate an urgent and present danger. "To eliminate the threat of a catastrophic Russian launch resulting from its deteriorating warning system, President Bush should advocate that both states adopt postures and procedures such that their nuclear weapons could only be fired after a delay of some days, so that Russia would not maintain its forces in a launch-on-warning posture. Such a posture would not compromise the US capability for retaliation as the bulk of our strategic forces would, without question, survive any attack. "The administration's position concerning strategic nuclear forces shows little regard for the obligations of the United States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- obligations undertaken because of enlightened self-interest, not altruism. In the context of the Summit, these obligations call for much swifter and deeper cuts, and for a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy. The administration's proposed cuts and its intention to keep withdrawn warheads at the ready implies that this reliance is not abating. When the state with by far the most powerful conventional forces asserts that it can only protect its vital interests with an undiminished reliance on nuclear forces, it is undermining the global effort to stem nuclear proliferation. "In the light of these facts and observations, we urge President Bush to propose an agreement to President Putin that would formally commit both states to: - accelerate the current reductions, and to not return warheads removed from the deployed forces under this agreement to active service;
- a far more rapid, clearly specified and transparent process for dismantling all undeployed warheads and for rendering their nuclear materials unusable, accompanied by a commitment for increased US and Allied financial support to Russia;
- replace their existing prompt-launch nuclear postures by postures within which retaliation to an attack would be delayed, and to adopt transparent measures to that end."
Dr. Hans Bethe
Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of Physics, Cornell University;
Head of the Manhattan Project's theoretical division Dr. Richard Garwin
Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign Relations; IBM Fellow Emeritus; consultant to the Sandia National Laboratory, former consultant to Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Marvin Goldberger
President Emeritus, California Institute of Technology; member, Council on Foreign Relations, National Academy of Sciences, American Academy of Arts and Sciences Dr. Kurt Gottfried
Emeritus Professor of Physics, Cornell University; Chairman of the Board, Union of Concerned Scientists Dr. Walter Kohn
Nobel Laureate; Emeritus Professor of Physics and Research Professor, University of California, Santa Barbara Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University; Recipient of National Medal of Science and Lawrence and Fermi Awards of the Department of Energy Dr. Steven Weinberg
Nobel Laureate; Jack S. Josey-Welch Foundation Chair in Science, Regental Professor, and Director, Theory Research Group, University of Texas | 
