| April 5, 2010 |  |
NPR Will Test President Obama On Transforming Nuclear Policy
The Obama administration is expected tomorrow to release its Nuclear Posture Review, which has been in preparation for a year. The review will set the direction of U.S. nuclear weapons policy for the next five to 10 years, laying out the purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons, the number of nuclear weapons needed to fulfill that purpose, and plans for how to maintain them in the future.
The review was developed through an interagency process headed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and approved by President Obama. Nonetheless, it will only serve as a guide. Actual policy will be set by presidential orders and directives, congressional budget decisions, and other steps over the coming months.
The review could be a visionary document that fundamentally reshapes U.S. nuclear weapons policy for the first time since the end of the Cold War in recognition that nuclear weapons have become a liability rather than an asset. Conversely, it could be a status quo document that fails to address new security threats. Either way, it will provide the first indication of whether President Obama will succeed in wresting nuclear weapons policy from Cold War thinkers who are focused on the past rather than today’s threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation.
President Obama has repeatedly stated that he intends to make substantial changes in U.S. policy. A year ago today, during a speech in Prague, he pledged to “put an end to Cold War thinking” and “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” He made that same pledge last September at the United Nations.
The Nuclear Posture Review will cover the following five key issues:
1. DECLARATORY POLICY: THE PURPOSE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
What it should say: The sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to a nuclear attack on the United States, its forces, or its allies by another country.
Why: Any role for nuclear weapons beyond deterring a nuclear attack is both unnecessary and counterproductive. It undermines the deterrence provided by U.S. conventional forces and can be used by other countries to justify their pursuit or improvement of nuclear weapons. Making it clear that the United States does not plan to use nuclear weapons first would reduce the incentive for other nations to acquire such weapons to deter a potential U.S. first strike.
What it likely will say: In lieu of “sole purpose,” the administration reportedly is considering using the phrase “primary purpose” or “fundamental purpose,” but the first formulation would undermine the president’s pledge to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. The latter formulation likely will win out. In either case, the review likely will state that the U.S. goal is to move to a “sole purpose” policy.
This issue has been perhaps the most contentious one. Arguments against the “sole purpose” formulation included concerns that Japan might see the U.S. nuclear umbrella as no longer adequate and decide to acquire its own nuclear weapons. However, this argument held little sway once Japan’s prime minister, foreign minister, and more than 200 members of the Diet expressed strong support for a U.S. “sole purpose” policy, as discussed in a recent UCS report. On the other hand, South Korea’s concerns about a North Korean invasion and its desire to keep all options on the table continue to make a “sole purpose” declaration politically difficult, despite the fact that South Korea would suffer severe consequences from any use of nuclear weapons against North Korea.
2. ARSENAL SIZE
What it should say: The United States needs far fewer than the approximately 5,000 nuclear weapons it currently possesses. It is prepared to reduce its nuclear arsenal to no more than 1,000 warheads—including those deployed and stored, and strategic and tactical weapons.
Once New START is ratified, the United States will seek further negotiations with Russia to reduce each country’s total arsenal to that level. After those negotiations are complete, it will seek multilateral negotiations with other nuclear-armed nations to further reduce the number of weapons globally.
Why: No current or conceivable threat to the United States requires it to maintain more than a few hundred survivable nuclear weapons, and there is no reason to link the size of U.S. nuclear forces to those of any other country. The delivery of fewer than a hundred warheads could destroy the society and economy of any country, and tens of detonations could kill more people than have ever been killed in any previous war. The only reason the United States would need to deploy more than a few hundred warheads is if it sought the capability to destroy Russia’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, which is a dangerous and pointless policy.
What it will likely say: The United States will significantly reduce the number of weapons it keeps in storage, but will not reduce the level of deployed forces much below those in the New START agreement. It is prepared to negotiate bilateral U.S.-Russian reductions in strategic weapons below the New START limits, and in tactical weapons.
3. MAINTAINING THE ARSENAL
What it should say: The United States does not need to develop or deploy new nuclear warheads, or modify existing warheads to create new military capabilities. It will minimize modifications to existing warheads’ nuclear explosive packages, and only will make changes that can be thoroughly vetted without full-scale nuclear explosive testing.
Why: Building new warheads is politically undesirable because it would undermine U.S. efforts to discourage other countries from seeking nuclear weapons and build support for its wider nonproliferation goals. Moreover, new warheads are not technically necessary: The current arsenal is certified to be reliable, safe from accidental detonation and plutonium dispersal, and secure against theft and unauthorized use. These weapons can be maintained for decades through refurbishment programs similar to previous life extension programs that replaced aging components with new ones manufactured to the original design specifications or with the same “form, fit and function.” Such long-term maintenance is feasible in large part due to the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which has helped weapons laboratory scientists better understand how weapon materials age.
There are technical risks associated with building a newly designed nuclear explosive package or modifying its components. U.S. nuclear weapons designers could upgrade plutonium dispersal safety and better guard against unauthorized use by reusing some nuclear explosive package components from other types of warheads or designing a new replacement package, but doing so would introduce new uncertainties in its performance and ironically undermine confidence in warhead reliability. In fact, the best way to make U.S. weapons more secure against theft and unauthorized use is to change the way they are stored, transported and deployed.
What it likely will say: The United States does not need to build new nuclear warheads now, but it will retain the option to do so should it become necessary to enhance reliability, safety or security. It does not need and will not build new weapons with new military capabilities or add new military capabilities to weapons that undergo life extension.
However, future life extension programs will not be limited to refurbishment, but will allow the reuse of nuclear explosive package components from other warheads and newly designed replacement packages. This formulation is consistent with a new stockpile management program created in the fiscal year 2010 defense authorization bill. In other words, the United States could build a new warhead in everything but name, as long as it did not have a new mission or military capability.
The administration is parsing its words carefully to bridge a disagreement between the president and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. After the election, President Obama declared that his administration would not pursue new nuclear weapons. His first budget eliminated the Bush administration’s Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program to design and produce a suite of new warheads, which Congress had consistently refused to fund. Even so, Secretary of Defense Gates publicly called for new warheads before and after the election.
4. U.S. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
What it should say: The United States believes that the roughly 200 tactical air-launched cruise missiles it deploys in five European countries as part of NATO’s “nuclear burden sharing” arrangements are no longer required to ensure European security. It is prepared to discuss with its NATO allies returning those weapons to the United States. Furthermore, the United States no longer needs any tactical sea-launched cruise missiles, and will retire the nuclear Tomahawk Land Attack Missile.
Why: Nuclear weapons in Europe are a vestige of a Cold War policy that relied on large numbers of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to deter a massive Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe. The Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, and there is no threat of a Russian conventional attack against Europe. Moreover, these weapons are among the most vulnerable to theft, and returning them to the United States would increase security. Several major NATO nations have expressed interest in removing these weapons from Europe. In February, the foreign ministers of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Luxemburg issued a joint letter asking that NATO’s foreign ministers reevaluate the organization’s nuclear policy at meeting later this month.
President George H. W. Bush removed the nuclear Tomahawk missile from deployment in 1992 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and since then it has remained in storage. It is scheduled for retirement in 2013. That makes sense. It served no purpose, since any target could be attacked with other U.S. nuclear weapons.
What it likely will say: Very little. It may state that NATO allies should discuss the status of U.S. tactical weapons in Europe, and may recommend consolidating them at fewer bases, possibly transferring them from Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands to bases in Italy and Turkey that already have warheads.
It likely will state that the United States will retire the nuclear Tomahawk missile as planned. In late February, Japanese press reports stated that U.S. officials told Japan of this plan, although the United States has not verified this publicly. The Tomahawk issue received a great deal of attention during the drafting of the Nuclear Posture Review, as discussed in a recent UCS report. In early 2009 Japanese officials testified before the Perry-Schlesinger Commission that the United States should retain these weapons, but the Japanese foreign minister disavowed that position in a December 2009 letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
5. ALERT STATUS
What it should say: The United States will not launch its nuclear weapons upon warning of an attack or when under attack, and will no longer maintain options for launching its nuclear weapons in a matter of minutes or hours. Rather, it will develop options that would allow the U.S. president days to respond to an attack. The United States encourages Russia to do the same. In the future, the United States will work with Russia to develop and negotiate verifiable measures to ensure that neither country could launch its missiles in a surprise attack.
Why: The United States and Russia each still maintain approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons on high alert status, ready for almost immediate launch. This situation carries with it the unacceptable risk of a mistaken, unauthorized or accidental launch by either side, putting millions of lives at risk. A reliable and credible U.S. nuclear deterrent does not require the ability to retaliate immediately but only the assurance that U.S. nuclear forces and command and control systems would survive an attack.
What it likely will say: The United States will increase the amount of time available to the president to decide to use nuclear weapons in response to an incoming attack.
Despite President Obama’s campaign pledge to take U.S. nuclear weapons off “hair-trigger alert,” the Nuclear Posture Review will not call for such a step. In general, the military is strongly opposed to eliminating options. Moreover, because submarine commanders are given the launch codes before heading to sea, de-alerting submarine-launched missiles would require making significant changes to policies and procedures that the Navy is loathe to do.
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