June 5, 2001 Report Warns of Russian Threat and Offers New Nuclear Vision
Experts Reveal Dangers in Outdated US Nuclear Weapons Strategy Existing US nuclear weapons policies are outdated and dangerous, according to a new report by 16 top scientists and security experts. The report recommends new US nuclear policies to address real and immediate dangers posed by the mistaken launch of nuclear missiles from Russia and to help prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The experts also warn that key policies proposed by President Bush might actually threaten our national security. The US and Russia still maintain massive nuclear arsenals ready for nearly instant use, a stance that the report finds is no longer justified. Nuclear policies remain frozen in a Cold War posture, and there is growing recognition of the need for change. Last month President Bush signaled his approach to nuclear policy by suggesting that the most urgent threat to US security comes from a small number of missiles in hostile states. The new report, Toward True Security: A US Nuclear Posture for the Next Decade, reaches a sharply different conclusion -- that over a thousand nuclear weapons in Russia on hair-trigger alert, combined with Russia's decaying early-warning system, pose an immediate risk of mistaken Russian attack against the US. As the most urgent threat to US security, the report argues that reducing this danger should be the primary focus of US policy. "By focusing on the wrong problem, the Bush administration is heading toward the wrong solution," said Tom Z. Collina, Director of Global Security at the Union of Concerned Scientists. "Missile programs in developing states are a cause for concern, but they pale in comparison to the dangers we face from Russia. The president's focus on the so-called rogue threat not only leaves the greater dangers from Russia unsolved, it makes them worse." According to the report, the deployment of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system would undermine Russia's confidence that it could retaliate in the unlikely event of a US attack, and thus forces Moscow to maintain its readiness for quick launch. NMD also threatens US-Russian cooperation in general, and with it the future of US-funded efforts to help Russia control its nuclear weapons, materials, and scientists. US deployment of NMD is also expected to spur the build up of Chinese long-range missiles. The report supports the Bush administration on two points. The first is a proposal made by the president during his election campaign to take US nuclear forces off hair-trigger alert, thus providing incentives for Moscow to do the same. "The greatest danger to America is a Russian nuclear attack resulting from error," said Bruce Blair, President of the Center for Defense Information. "By reducing its ability to launch promptly, the US can spur Moscow to take its finger off the nuclear trigger, and thus reduce the risk of a mistaken launch." The president has yet to act on this campaign pledge. The report also agrees with the Bush administration on the need to move ahead with US-Russian arsenal reductions, though again the administration has not specified its plans. "No conceivable threat requires the US to keep more than a few hundred survivable warheads," said Richard Garwin, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and key contributor to the first US hydrogen bomb. "We recommend US unilateral cuts down to 1,000 total warheads, followed by binding negotiations. This would greatly enhance global efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons." The study recommends that the US avoid the temptation to expand the roles and missions for nuclear weapons and clearly state that the only purpose of its nuclear arsenal is to deter and, if necessary, respond to a nuclear attack. Some have advocated that US nuclear weapons be used to deter the use of chemical, biological, and even conventional weapons. "Adding roles beyond deterrence of nuclear attack is both unnecessary and counterproductive," said Robert Sherman, Director of Nuclear Security at the Federation of American Scientists. "If the nation with the strongest conventional military force in the world chooses to rely on nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear attack, how can we tell weaker states that they don't need nuclear weapons?"
Toward True Security was produced by the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists, and the Natural Resources Defense Council. The authors are: Dr. Richard L. Garwin, Council on Foreign Relations and UCS; Dr. Frank N. von Hippel, Princeton University and FAS; Bruce Blair, Center for Defense Information; Robert Sherman, FAS; Steve Fetter, University of Maryland; Dr. Kurt Gottfried, Cornell University and UCS; Dr. Henry Kelly, FAS; Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund, UCS and MIT; Tom Collina, UCS; Dr. David Wright, UCS and MIT; Amb. Jonathan Dean, UCS; Dr. Thomas B. Cochran, NRDC; Dr. Adam Segal, UCS; Dr. Matthew G. McKinzie, NRDC; Stephen Young, UCS; and Dr. Robert S. Norris, NRDC. |
