Documents Reveal US Intentions
Comments on documents revealing the US strategy for renegotiating the ABM treaty with Russia, leaked to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 2000
by Lisbeth Gronlund and David C. Wright
What these documents reveal about US nuclear policy is far more interesting than what they reveal about the US proposed changes to the ABM Treaty.
The most interesting and revealing of these documents are the US talking points intended to address Russia's concerns about the US national missile defense (NMD). In these documents, the United States asserts that the US NMD will not undermine Russia's deterrent for two reasons, arguing that:
- Both countries "will possess under the terms of any possible future arms reduction agreements, large, diversified arsenals of strategic offensive weapons."
- Russia keeps its nuclear forces on constant alert (to permit launch on warning) and will continue to do so. The documents point out that by launching on warning of an incoming attack, enough of Russia's nuclear missiles would survive a US first strike that Russian forces could still overcome a US NMD.
The first point makes it clear that to deploy its NMD system, the United States is willing to give up -- indefinitely -- the potential for cutting the Russian arsenal below 1000 missiles. If the United States is telling Russia that retaining a large arsenal for the indefinite future is its hedge against a US NMD system, then the United States cannot credibly argue that it is also taking steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Just this week, at the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference taking place at the UN in New York, Secretary of State Albright and other administration officials have been trying to assure the rest of the world that the United States remains committed to fulfilling its obligations under the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. These documents reveal just how empty those assurances are.
The second point makes it clear that the United States is also willing to pay an even higher price for its NMD system: it is willing to live with the continued threat of Russian unauthorized, accidental, and erroneous launches, which remains the biggest missile threat to the United States. Despite the end of the cold war, both the United States and Russia deploy large numbers of nuclear-armed missiles ready for immediate launch, so they could launch their weapons before a first strike could disarm them. The document itself states that under tactical warning of a US first strike, "Russia's response to an assault would obviously be to send about a thousand warheads..." This is exactly the concern. A problem with Russia's early warning system that led to false warning could result in a devastating attack on the United States -- and the United States should be doing everything in its power to change this situation. Instead, in its talking points, the United States almost encourages Russia to maintain its launch on warning policy, because this would permit the United Stated to deploy its NMD without undercutting Russia's deterrent.
The US proposed protocol to modify the ABM Treaty would only permit the first phase of the planned NMD. US administration officials argue that it is in Russia's interest to agree to treaty changes now so it will have predictability about the future of the treaty and can plan accordingly. As reported in the New York Times (Jane Perlez, "US Says Russians May Want a Deal on Missile Defense," 27 April 2000, p.1):
As one administration official said, "The big sell is: 'Take a sure bet now. Don't take a risk in the future.'"
However, these documents make clear that even if Russia does agree, it will not gain predictability about the future of the treaty. In its unilateral statement, the United States anticipates that it will seek further treaty changes to permit a larger NMD. The protocol stipulates that the parties could begin these next negotiations anytime after March 2001 -- less than a year from now.
The US proposed treaty changes take the form of a protocol that would exempt the planned NMD from the restrictions of the original ABM Treaty. Because so many changes would be needed to the treaty text to accommodate even the first phase of the NMD, negotiating such an exemption is a more attractive approach for the United States -- from both a political and negotiating standpoint. This would allow the United States to argue that the changes to the treaty text were minimal. But this does not change the fact that the original treaty is altered significantly. For example, three of the first five articles of the treaty would have to be changed significantly just to permit the first phase of deployment.
As the ABM treaty now stands, the limits on radars are fundamental to the ability to prevent rapid breakout because it takes a long time to build a radar and doing so is visible. In these documents, the United States argues that limiting the number of interceptors and launchers (rather than restricting radars) would effectively limit the size of the defense and provide a long warning of breakout. The documents state: "In fact, our experience to date indicates that the speed with which the US could build interceptor missiles, not radars, is a key factor preventing rapid expansion." This argument is not compelling, for two reasons:
- the United States is arguing that the reason it needs to begin construction of the radar in Alaska is that the radar -- not the interceptors -- is what will limit the deployment date of the first phase of the system, and
- it ignores the possibility of linking sea-based Navy Theater Wide interceptors into the NMD system, of which the US plans to deploy more than 600.
Navy Theater Wide was the unresolved point of contention on the demarcation agreements because Russia feared it could be used as a strategic missile defense. And according to a recent Pentagon study (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea-Based Assets to National Missile Defense," 1 June 1999) the NMD X-band (SHF) radars could support the NTW interceptors in engagements against strategic missiles. The study concluded that integrating the NTW into the NMD would result in a more "flexible and robust" national defense. And there is a vocal constituency in the US for doing just that. So Russia's fears are well-grounded.
The documents also state: "Even a US national missile defense system with a large number of SHF radars, which we would like to deploy in the long term, would not be able to deal with an arsenal of the size or sophistication that Russia would likely deploy under START-III." This makes no sense because the full system will have nine X- band (SHF) radars that would provide world-wide coverage of ICBM launches and could be used to support a very large number of interceptors. It may be that these radars could not be used to defend against Russian submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launched from some parts of the oceans, but Russia has never relied on its SLBMs and is not likely to do so under START III.
Finally, the documents include a long verification protocol. It is quite detailed, but contains a gaping loophole: how can Russia have confidence that US Navy Theater Wide (NTW) interceptors (of which the US plans to deploy some 600 on ships) would not be integrated into the NMD system, thus turning a limited defense into a much larger one?
The authors are senior staff scientists at the Union of Concerned Scientists and researchers at the MIT Security Studies Program. Gronlund serves on the Board of the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, which publishes the Bulletin.
