Experts' Letter on Exporting Nuclear Materials
April 12, 2005
The Honorable Joe Barton, Chair
Energy and Commerce Committee
United States House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6115
The Honorable John D. Dingell, Ranking Member
Energy and Commerce Committee
United States House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6115
Dear Representatives Barton and Dingell:
We are writing to urge you to reject a provision in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Section 633 of the nuclear title, "Medical Isotope Production") that would seriously weaken export controls on highly enriched uranium (HEU), the easiest material for terrorists to use to make a nuclear bomb. We urge you to support instead the amendment offered by Representative Edward Markey (D-MA), which would retain current HEU export control provisions while authorizing a comprehensive study of the issue by the National Academy of Sciences. Surely, the potential costs and risks of weakening a major provision of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation law should be carefully analyzed and weighed before going forward.
Last year, Vice President Cheney warned that the biggest threat faced by our nation was the possibility that terrorists would use weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, against our cities. Keeping weapon-usable nuclear materials out of circulation is the best way to help prevent this disastrous scenario from occurring. Now is not the time to loosen our own restrictions on export of potential terrorist bomb material to other countries where the United States does not have direct control over its security.
Existing law limiting U.S. HEU exports (Section 134 of the Atomic Energy Act) has been on the books for more than a decade, and there is no evidence that it has interfered in any way with the supply of medical isotopes in the past, or that it will suddenly begin to do so in the future. The law as it stands allows continued export of HEU to producers of medical isotopes, as long as they agree to convert to low-enriched uranium (which cannot be used as the core of a nuclear bomb) when it becomes technically and economically possible to do so, and to cooperate with the United States to bring that day closer. We strongly believe that this law has served our country well for more than ten years, drastically reducing commerce in potential bomb material while ensuring continued supplies of needed medicines, and that this is the right policy to maintain for the future. This law directly supports the call of Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman in a speech on April 5 to "set a goal of working to end the commercial use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors."
If enacted, the objectionable provision in the Energy Policy Act would allow foreign companies to receive U.S. HEU for use in medical isotope production "targets" without having to commit to converting to low-enriched uranium targets when feasible. This would perpetuate commerce in HEU by crippling US efforts to wean foreign isotope producers from their dependence on this dangerous material. The provision would also effectively allow retransfers of U.S.-origin HEU to any nation in the European Union, a club that includes Hungary, Poland and Latvia—countries that already possess poorly secured stockpiles of HEU.
The American public depends on Congress to do all it can to reduce the threat of a catastrophic nuclear terrorist attack. Keeping our own nuclear weapon materials out the reach of terrorists is an obvious and simple first step. We urge you to support this policy by rejecting the medical isotope provision in the energy bill and by supporting Representative Markey's amendment.
Sincerely,
Peter Bradford, Former Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Matthew Bunn, Senior Research Associate, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Thomas B. Cochran, Director, Nuclear Program, Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Charles D. Ferguson, Science and Technology Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*
Victor Gilinsky, Former Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Fred C. Iklé, Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) in the Reagan Administration, and Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Ford Administration
Alan Kuperman, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University
Paul Leventhal, Founding President, Nuclear Control Institute
Edwin S. Lyman, Senior Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists
Henry S. Rowen, Professor of Public Policy and Management Emeritus, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) in the George H. Bush Administration; Member, Defense Policy Board
Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Frank von Hippel, Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
*Organization listed for identification purposes only.
cc: Members of Energy and Commerce Committee
