The Bond Amendment: Making It Easier for Terrorists to Get the Bomb
June 2003
Over a decade ago, Congress enacted the Schumer amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, placing strict controls on U.S. civilian exports of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear weapons. Today, when the threat of nuclear terrorism has never been greater, Congress should be imposing even tougher controls over U.S. weapons-usable nuclear materials to ensure that they remain secure against theft. But Senator Bond has offered an amendment that does exactly the opposite—it would loosen restrictions on the export of U.S. bomb-grade uranium to inadequately protected foreign facilities by overriding key Schumer amendment provisions. The Bond amendment is bad policy and should be rejected.
The Schumer Amendment
The Schumer amendment to the Energy Policy Act of 1992 placed strict controls on the export of U.S. highly enriched uranium (HEU), a key ingredient for nuclear weapons. Because HEU can be used to make a nuclear weapon using a relatively simple design, it is particularly attractive to terrorists. Research reactors can use HEU for two distinct purposes: as fuel for the reactor and as "targets" for radioisotope production. The Schumer amendment was explicitly designed to address both uses.
To avoid imposing undue hardship on companies that currently use HEU, the Schumer amendment permits exports of U.S. HEU to foreign research and test reactors under certain circumstances. HEU exports are permitted if: no alternative, lower-enrichment fuels or targets are available that can be used; the recipient commits to switching to a lower-enrichment fuel or target when one becomes available; and the U.S. government is actively developing alternative fuels or targets that could be used.
Thus, this law has encouraged foreign countries that receive U.S. HEU for use at research reactors to reduce their dependence on this dangerous material and cooperate with the United States to develop alternatives that use low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is unsuitable for direct use in nuclear weapons. This, in turn, has reduced the amount of U.S. HEU being transported and stored under inadequate security outside our borders, and has made it harder for terrorists to steal U.S. HEU abroad and fabricate it into a crude but effective nuclear weapon that could be delivered back home.
The Bond Amendment
Senator Bond has proposed a measure that would weaken the existing controls on HEU exports. The Bond amendment would waive the Schumer requirements for exports of HEU for medical isotope production (the targets) as long as the reactor itself does not also use HEU for fuel or has an agreement with the U.S. government to develop an alternative fuel. Senator Bond is expected to offer this language as an amendment to S.14 (the Energy Bill).
The Bond amendment is essentially a special-interest provision designed to benefit a single foreign isotope producer—MDS Nordion of Canada—by allowing it to continue importing U.S. HEU indefinitely for the production of medical isotopes. Canada has built two new isotope production reactors that are designed to use LEU fuel, so HEU exports for use as targets at these reactors would comply with the Bond amendment provisions. This amendment will also benefit the Canadian government, which heavily subsidizes Nordion's operations. And since the Bond amendment would remove any incentive for Nordion to convert its process to LEU, smaller isotope producers in other countries that use HEU from non-U.S. sources will lose any incentive to convert to LEU themselves, and the global nuclear terrorist threat from commerce in HEU will continue to grow.
A statement circulated by Sen. Bond's office earlier this year gives the rationale for his amendment (attached). Below, we review the claims from his office and other supporters of the amendment.
CLAIM: The use of low-enriched uranium (LEU) is not a feasible alternative.
FACT: A number of countries already use LEU for isotope production (e.g., Australia) or are converting their production process from HEU to LEU as a result of the Schumer amendment (e.g., Argentina, Indonesia). In fact, Nordion is now the only foreign recipient of U.S. HEU for isotope production. LEU-based target designs have been extensively tested and qualified outside Canada. It is technically feasible for Nordion to adapt its HEU target-processing facility to process LEU targets. The most significant impact would be a 10 percent increase in the number of waste cans produced—a small price for Nordion to pay for the nonproliferation benefits of eliminating its dependence on HEU.
CLAIM: The Bond amendment is needed to ensure the continued supply of medical radioisotopes, which are crucial in treating cancer patients, to the United States.
FACT: The supply of medical isotopes has not been adversely affected by the Schumer amendment over the decade that it has been in force. The Schumer amendment requires that foreign recipients of U.S. HEU for production of isotopes commit to using LEU production targets when such targets become available. The United States has never denied an HEU export license under the Schumer amendment to any isotope producer that makes this commitment in good faith. The United States has not even denied an HEU export license to Nordion, although Nordion reneged on a 1990 commitment to phase out the use of HEU by 2000. Moreover, if Nordion were able to prove that LEU conversion would be so expensive that it would threaten the economic viability of its operation, NRC could waive the Schumer requirements. In any event, the costs are low compared with the additional security benefits.
CLAIM: Only small amounts of HEU are used in reactors that produce medical isotopes.
FACT: The amount of HEU the United States exports to Canada for medical isotope production is quite significant in terms of the amount that would be needed for a nuclear weapon, and would be of enormous value to terrorists. Canada has stockpiled about 100 kilograms of HEU that originated in the United States—enough to make two simple Hiroshima-type bombs or at least four bombs of a more advanced design. And even after the HEU is irradiated and processed to remove the desired isotope, the waste, which is retained in Canada, is still highly enriched and will continue to pose a significant proliferation and terrorism risk.
CLAIM: The HEU exported by the United States to Canada is well-protected from terrorists.
FACT: The United States does not require foreign facilities to protect HEU that originated in this country with the same degree of rigor it requires at U.S. facilities. Indeed, no other country has controls as strict as those in the United States. Nor does the United States require plant security forces in Canada (or any other recipient country) to demonstrate their capability to repel an armed commando assault as a condition for HEU supply. In contrast, the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) require that "force-on-force" exercises be carried out routinely at "Category I" facilities to test the ability of security forces to repel armed assaults.
A recent assessment by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service concluded that "Canada . . . remains a frequent target for clandestine and illicit procurement activities by countries and organizations of proliferation concern, most of which lack the indigenous capability to develop and produce WMD [weapons of mass destruction]." Yet there is no indication that Nordion is overly concerned about terrorism. Last November, Nordion wrote to the NRC to complain about additional security measures for the transportation of large quantities of radioactive material that could be used to make "dirty bombs" and suggested that the "use of armed guards not be a mandatory requirement."
FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: Dr. Edwin Lyman, senior scientist, Global Security Program, UCS; (202) 223-6133, ext. 108; elyman@ucsusa.org.
