New U.S. Approach Toward Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Weapons
U.S. Russia Agreement and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
In early April 2009, on his first trip to Europe as president, Barack Obama made good on his campaign promises and took the first steps toward fundamentally reshaping U.S. nuclear weapons policy. On April 1, the president and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev released a joint statement in which both nations agreed to "demonstrate leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world."
On April 5, President Obama gave a groundbreaking speech on nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic, which signaled his administration’s intent to significantly reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and laid out a bold yet pragmatic plan to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. He also stated that the United States was committed to the visionary goal of “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”
Now begins the real work. Together, we must build broad bipartisan congressional and public support for the steps President Obama outlined, including:
- A new U.S.-Russian agreement to verifiably reduce their nuclear arsenals, now on a fast-track to completion by the end of this year, and Senate approval of this treaty.
- Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans explosive testing of nuclear weapons worldwide.
International agreements require approval by 67 senators (two thirds of the Senate). A few senators with a long history of opposing nuclear arms control agreements will pull out all the stops to oppose these sensible steps, most notably Senate ratification of the CTBT.
New U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Reduction Agreement
The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and Russia expires in December 2009. START reduced the strategic nuclear forces of the two sides to no more than 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles (land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles, plus heavy bombers) apiece by December 5, 2001. In addition, START established a far-reaching system of notifications and inspections that provides an accurate assessment of the size and location of each side’s forces. Those would also expire if a new agreement or extension of START is not agreed to by December 2009.
Under the Bush administration, the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive ReductionsTreaty (SORT) in May 2002. SORT calls for deeper reductions in operationally deployed strategic warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 each by the year 2012, but did not include any verification provisions. Moreover, SORT does not establish any limits on delivery systems or require their destruction, and allows excess warheads to be stored. Finally, the treaty expires on the day its limitations take effect. We need a better, more binding framework for cutting nuclear arsenals.
The recent Obama-Medvedev statement commits the two countries to immediately “pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty. We are instructing our negotiators to start talks immediately on this new treaty and to report on results achieved in working out the new agreement by July.” This follow-on agreement which is widely expected to reduce the warhead limits of each side to no more than 1,500 or less will, in the words of President Obama “set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.” Senate leaders have made it clear to the president that a treaty must be submitted to the Senate by August to allow for enough time for Senate debate and approval before the December START expiration.
Senate Ratification and Global Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The CTBT prohibiting all nuclear explosions-whether for military testing or civil purposes-was concluded in 1996. To date, 180 countries have signed and 148 have ratified the treaty. The treaty will take effect or enter into force once all 44 nations with nuclear power or research reactors ratify it. Three of these 44 have not signed: India, North Korea, and Pakistan, all of which have nuclear weapons. Another six have signed but not ratified: China, Israel, and the United States (which all have nuclear weapons) and Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran (which do not). President Clinton signed the CTBT in 1996, but the Senate voted against ratification in 1999.
While U.S. ratification is not enough for the CTBT to enter into force, it would compel other holdout nations to follow suit and send an unambiguous signal recommitting the United States to international cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation.
Senate ratification of the CTBT would thus enhance U.S. security for several reasons:
- Entry into force would constrain the further development of nuclear weapons by other states.
- U.S. ratification would strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent more nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.
- The International Monitoring System would provide comprehensive global verification of the CTBT.
- The U.S. nuclear arsenal would remain highly reliable without nuclear explosive testing.
