Space Weapons Funding
The Bush administration is requesting $10 million in funding in fiscal year 2009 (FY09) for a Space Test Bed as part of its effort to develop a space-based missile defense system. The program would begin the process of putting weapons in space for the first time and would therefore have important and dangerous long-term implications.
Last year, Congress rejected funding for the Space Test Bed. This year, UCS is concerned that several influential senators have expressed a greater willingness to fund space weapons and anti-satellite (ASAT) programs, on the mistaken assumption that the United States can effectively "defend" its satellites using weapons and that other countries, namely China, are rushing to deploy space weapons.
The publicly stated intent of the Space Test Bed program is to develop space-based missile interceptors; to create the command, control, battle management and communications structures for space-based missile defense; and to launch interceptors into orbit and test them against ballistic missiles. Not only would the program break the international "taboo" against weapons in space, the interceptors would not provide an effective defense, despite the enormous cost of deploying such a system. A very large number of space-based interceptors would be required to attempt to defend against a missile attack, yet such a system would be vulnerable to being overwhelmed by the rapid launch of a few missiles, or to direct attack by short-range missiles.
In addition, while space-based interceptors would not provide a credible defense against ballistic missiles, the technology being developed would be useful for offensive attacks on satellites. A congressional decision to fund this program could therefore send a message to other countries that the United States is developing a space-based ASAT capability. This may encourage similar development by other countries, which would reduce U.S. security.
Since satellites are highly vulnerable to attack and are difficult to defend, the development and deployment of ASAT capabilities internationally would make U.S. satellites less safe.
Space weapons cannot guarantee the safety of satellites. Rather than building space weapons, the United States should instead be taking steps to prevent the development and deployment of ASAT weapons, and to make its satellites less attractive targets, which is the best way to keep satellites safe.
To do the former, the United States should lead efforts to negotiate international agreements to prevent space weaponization and attacks on satellites; Russia and China support such negotiations. International diplomacy and law are essential to ensure the ability to use space in a safe and predictable manner in the future and make certain conflict in space does not cause crisis on earth. UCS supports a Space Code of Conduct and a set of international laws that will set expected behaviors and build confidence and transparency, and limit technologies and behaviors that are counter to these goals.
To make satellites less attractive targets, we need to have earth- and air-based backup systems to help guarantee that capabilities currently derived from satellites will continue to be available, even in a crisis. In addition, making individual satellites and satellite systems more resistant to attacks, by, for example, including anti-jamming technology on them and having more than one satellite that can do a particular job, will make U.S. space capabilities more robust.
