Spring 2010
By Laura Grego
The nature of space operations has changed dramatically in the 50 years of the Space Age. Today more than 50 nations own satellites or a significant share in one, and commercial operators own more satellites than nations do. The nearly 1,000 active satellites now in orbit (see the figure below) have assumed critical roles in banking, telecommunications, navigation, and other civilian, scientific, and military activities.
However, the existing laws and norms relating to the use of space have not kept pace with these changes. For example, the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 designated space as "the province of all mankind" and forbade the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space, yet no organization was ever created to interpret the OST's guidelines, moderate disputes, or verify that its signatories are complying with its tenets. As a result, the space above Earth has come to resemble the Wild West, with ever more satellites and few restrictions on behavior, increasing the risk of accidents (see the sidebar) and of misunderstandings that could lead to conflicts on the ground.
| In this issue of Catalyst:
> Securing the Skies |
U.S. policy in the last decade focused on securing space via unilateral and military means, and some policy makers were skeptical about the ability of diplomacy or new laws to serve U.S. interests. The Obama administration has indicated that it will take a different approach. To help reshape U.S. policies on civil, commercial, and military space and re-engage the international community on space security, UCS worked with experts in the security community to identify high-priority steps the United States should take to ensure the sustainability of the space environment, keep satellites safe, and enhance stability in space and on the ground.
Setting Long-Term Goals
A successful space security regime could be constructed in many different ways. For example, nations could revise and expand the Outer Space Treaty or negotiate new laws, devise coordination strategies and codes of conduct, and/or implement technical solutions for keeping satellites safe. Regardless of which strategies are ultimately adopted into a long-term plan, UCS recommends that the plan be constructed to meet these goals:
- Ensure the long-term, sustainable use of space
- Permit safe access to space for all, with minimum interference (from debris or signal jamming, for instance)
- Prevent activities in space from increasing tensions between countries or leading to arms buildups
- Prevent activities in space from sparking or exacerbating crises on the ground
The physics of space requires a multilateral approach to meeting these goals. Because satellites are in constant motion above Earth, travel at high speeds, and tend to use similar orbits, close coordination between satellite operators in this increasingly crowded environment is necessary to avoid unintentional interference and even collisions, which can produce debris that remains in orbit for decades or centuries (posing a long-term threat to other satellites). Satellites also cannot be reliably protected from deliberate attacks via unilateral and military means. Because the actions of one nation can harm all space users, the secure use of space hinges on global cooperation and awareness.
Protecting Satellites and the Space Environment
An important step toward achieving the goals listed above is to ensure that satellites currently in space are kept safe from damage or attack. To that end, UCS recommends the United States take the following initial steps to secure its space assets:
Reduce the impact of an attack on U.S. satellites. The United States should design its critical satellite systems to be able to continue providing services even if individual satellites are compromised. This can be achieved by building redundant capability in multiple satellites or distributing a single satellite's workload among clusters of satellites. Satellite systems can be further strengthened by using protective measures such as anti-signal-jamming technology, and by developing ground- and air-based backup systems for high-priority functions such as navigation and communications. These efforts would also reduce the incentive to attack U.S. satellites in the first place, since there would be less to gain from their loss.
Declare a moratorium on the intentional disabling or damaging of satellites. Such a moratorium would preclude U.S. action against its own defunct or malfunctioning satellites as well as satellites of other nations. This would limit the operational development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, in turn assuring other countries that the United States is serious about mutually agreed-upon limits on dangerous technologies. It would also set a standard that other countries need to meet to be considered credible partners in space security negotiations.
Pledge not to be the first nation to station dedicated weapons in space. Russia made such a pledge in 2004, and is currently the only nation to have done so. By following suit, the United States can encourage other space powers to take similar action. Because being the first to put a weapon in space conveys no lasting advantage, the United States does not cede the "high ground" by making such a statement.
Pledge not to develop or deploy space-based missile defense interceptors. The Bush administration had proposed space-based missile defense research and development that would, for the first time, place dedicated weapons in orbit. As UCS and others have shown, space-based missile defense would be technically challenging and enormously expensive, and could be easily defeated by a determined enemy, so a full system is unlikely to be realized. However, even a few "test" interceptors in orbit may be viewed as a threat by other countries. While Congress has repeatedly refused to fund this proposal, a pledge not to pursue space-based missile defense would represent a more durable commitment.
Pledge not to use any land-, sea-, or air-based missile defense systems to attack or destroy a satellite. Long-range missile defense technologies currently under development may prove to be much more effective at targeting satellites than ballistic missiles. This pledge would prohibit nations from testing this potential capability, thus reducing their confidence in using a missile defense system in this way.
We Need to Talk
Ultimately, true space security will depend on an open dialogue between space-faring nations. UCS calls on the United States to restart the process by taking the following steps:
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Wanted: Order on the Final Frontier Recent events demonstrate the need for better coordination and monitoring of space activity. As the following incidents show, existing laws and systems governing space operations are not up to the challenge of keeping space safe.
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Bring leadership to international discussions. Because it is the largest user of space, and because it has a history of opposing space security negotiations, the United States must be an active and cooperative participant for international efforts to succeed. The United States should collaborate with other space users to identify the most productive venue for negotiations and lay out an agenda that covers the full range of space security issues and includes a variety of approaches for solving them (such as treaties and/or less formal cooperative agreements).
Assemble a negotiating team with the appropriate expertise. Because of the lack of serious engagement on space security issues for many years, the United States and other countries do not have in place people with the diplomatic, technical, and legal expertise required to make these discussions bear fruit.
Review and modify regulations that hinder cooperation on commercial and civil space activities. The United States has not fostered space cooperation with the international community in general, but it has taken a particularly strong stance against China, blocking Chinese access to all U.S. space and missile technology. Cooperation between the United States and China on peaceful, scientific uses of outer space could build the level of trust needed for a comprehensive space security regime.
Is Progress in the Stars?
The United States is the country most invested in space and most poised to benefit from a comprehensive, multilateral space security plan. Creating such a plan will take leadership and sustained engagement by the United States, and the Obama administration has the opportunity to lay the groundwork for meaningful action. It is in the process of rewriting the National Space Policy, which guides U.S. space activities across all sectors (e.g., civil, commercial, government, military), while priorities for the national security uses of space will be established in the first-ever Space Posture Review, slated to be completed in 2010.
President Obama also seems to understand that a working relationship with China is important to achieving true space security. In a joint statement issued with President Hu Jintao in November 2009, he stated that, "The two countries have common interests in promoting the peaceful use of outer space and agree to take steps to enhance security in outer space."
UCS is playing an active role in shaping the Obama administration's policies, and we are currently briefing U.S. policy makers about the recommendations described in this article.
Laura Grego is a senior scientist in the Global Security Program.
Photo: Missile Defense Agency
