policy
COP-4 in Buenos Aires: A Real and Safe Progress
A Report on the Meeting of the 4th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention Buenos Aires, Argentina November 2-13, 1998
Printer Friendly PDF Version
The fourth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP-4) to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Buenos Aires over the first two weeks of November. There was much to be addressed at COP-4 and, though expectations were modest from the outset, some important milestones were achieved. And not all of the achievements were on the official agenda -– COP-4 also saw movement on developing country commitments, US commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and a marked shift in the attitudes of the business community.
Much of the Kyoto Protocol wording was hammered out at the very last minute -– well after official time had expired for the negotiating sessions –- resulting in a number of ambiguous and ill-defined text passages to be clarified by decision of the nations. Several of these items are crucial to implementing the Kyoto Protocol and needed to be deliberated by the multination working groups set up in Buenos Aires. They included flexible mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism and the consequence of non-compliance of industrial nations with their legally binding emissions reduction targets.
A Plan of Action for Flexible Mechanisms
For their most significant accomplishment of COP-4, negotiators were able to conclude an agreement to be known as the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. While it was clear from the outset that countries would not be able to resolve all issues before them, the Plan of Action is an important accord because of two key features that will advance the resolution of unfinished business from Kyoto. One strengthens the provisions of the Convention on technology transfer and on assistance with climate change adaptation for developing countries. The other key stipulation sets a deadline of COP-6 in late 2000 for decisions on the unfinished business from Kyoto, particularly the rules and guidelines for the flexibility mechanisms (emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism).
On the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) -– which allows industrialized countries to fund greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reducing projects in developing countries and receive credit towards their Kyoto targets –- Honduras advanced a new proposal on behalf of several Latin American countries that would allow for certified emissions reductions projects to begin provisionally in 2000. Projects could receive formal credit once signatory parties have decided on the CDM crediting guidelines and the provisional projects are vetted and deemed to have met them. While the 2000 start date for the CDM is already stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol, the Mechanism can not be formally implemented until the Protocol enters into force. As this is unlikely before 2001 at the earliest, the Honduran proposal would have allowed CDM project crediting ahead of formal CDM implementation under the Protocol. The proposal was not adopted in Buenos Aires, but in the decision on the mechanisms workplan, it was made clear that priority would be given to the CDM.
One pleasant surprise in Buenos Aires was the decision to establish a workgroup on the issue of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. It’s vital to the long-term success of this process to construct a compliance regime that spells out binding consequences for countries that fail to meet their commitments under the Protocol. This issue wasn’t on the formal agenda for COP-4, but thanks in part to the persistent efforts on non-governmental organizations, governments agreed to work towards a decision on compliance issues by COP-6.
Argentina Volunteers to Limit Emissions
Midway through the second week, President Carlos Saul Menem formally announced that Argentina would take on binding emissions limitation obligations, and would propose specific targets at COP-5 in a year’s time. While the issue of how ambitious a target Argentina will take on remains to be seen, President Menem’s announcement represented an enormous commitment for a developing country at this time.
Following the host country’s lead, Kazhakstan, recognized as a country with an economy in transition, announced the next day that it too would assume a binding commitment voluntarily. At the same time, it was granted observer status in the US-led "Umbrella Group," presumably with an eye to participating in an emissions trading regime. Other countries also signaled interest in making a commitment to limiting their emissions in the future. Among them are South Korea and the small Pacific island nations of Niue and Nauru.
The announcements had been preceded by some stormy discussion about developing country commitments. Argentina was determined at the outset of the meeting to raise the issue of developing country participation in the regime of binding emissions limits under the Kyoto Protocol. The topic was not formally on the COP-4 agenda but the President of the COP, Argentine Secretary of Natural Resources Maria Julia Alsogaray, used the Chair’s prerogative on opening day to force a debate on whether the issue should be added. Four hours of argument ultimately excluded the topic from the agenda but generated lots of sparks for media coverage.
Nevertheless, the discussion revealed that a number of developing countries are in favor of participation from their own ranks to reduce global GHG emissions. Latin American and African regional groups of developing countries are increasingly receptive to "meaningful participation" in the Kyoto process because of a growing interest in the potential resulting flow of technology and capital investment. However, their interest exposed clear fractures within the Group of 77 Developing Countries and China (known as the G-77 + China) and provoked an intense response from harder-line elements of the G-77, particularly India and China, that nearly blocked agreement on the Plan of Action and that will continue to color the debate on its implementation.
While it is clear that the long term challenge of global warming can only be met with an effort that includes key developing nations, the fragmentation of the monolithic stance of the G-77 group of developing countries on this key issue is a necessary "growing pain" for the longer-term success of the treaty process, and may come to be seen as the most significant outcome of the Buenos Aires meeting.
A US Signature Splits Congress and Industry
Argentina’s announcement also turned out to be the political catalyst the US Administration needed to rebuff opponents in Congress and industry and announce its intention to sign the Kyoto Protocol in New York City the next day. Though the two events were not formally orchestrated, one observer noted they certainly had "all the choreography of a well-executed tango." Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, the lead negotiator for the US delegation, commented that, "In taking this action, the United States reaffirms our commitment to work with nations gathered here to address the challenge of climate change and we are guided by the firm belief that signing will serve our environmental, economic and national security goals."
The US signature bring to 60 the number of nations that have signed the Kyoto Protocol while two nations have already ratified it. (The Protocol will enter into force after 53 more ratifications are deposited with the UN, including a sufficient number of industrialized countries to account for 55% of the group’s 1990 emissions.) The move was generally welcomed by environmental groups (UCS among them) and supported by some members of the US Congressional delegation attending COP-4, including Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Reps. Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Dennis Kucinich (D-OH). But it drew condemnation from the fossil fuel lobby and other Congressional delegates even before the event took place.
As rumors of an impending US announcement circulated at the meeting, a press conference was organized by five Republicans (Reps. Dan Burton, James Sensenbrenner, Jo Ann Emerson, Joe Knollenberg, and Ken Calvert) and sole Democrat Ron Klink. The Representatives denounced the "fatally flawed" Kyoto Protocol, citing a lack of meaningful participation by developing countries and exaggerated economic consequences to the US economy (Rep. Klink even stated his belief that implementing the treaty will "de-industrialize" the US). After a further display of ignorance of the science of climate change – assisted by prominent skeptic S. Fred Singer – the group went on to threaten the Clinton Administration with harsh retribution if the US signed the Kyoto Protocol during the Buenos Aires meeting. (If you would like to read the response of the US Climate Action Network to the Congressional Delegation press event, see Related Links.)
After the signing, Senator Charles Hagel (R-NE), one of the leading opponents to the Kyoto Protocol in the Senate, repeated the Representatives’ criticisms. More ominously, Sen. Jesse Helms, powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that vets treaties before sending them on for a full Senate vote, called for a quick submission of the Kyoto Protocol "so that the Senate may reject the treaty and scrap the process altogether."
In stark contrast to the antics of the recalcitrant members of the Congressional delegation was the new attitude from some business participants at COP-4. This time around the long-time constructive players at the climate negotiations, such as the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, were augmented by the attendance of the new Pew Center on Global Climate Change and its member companies (which include American Electric Power (AEP), 3M, Boeing, Toyota, DuPont, United Technologies Corp. (UTC) and British Petroleum among others), as well as by a number of European and Latin American business voices.
In part, the progressive approach being adopted by businesses participating at the negotiations is due to a belief that it’s "better if we're at the table and helping write the rules," as an AEP official was quoted as saying, but they are also motivated out of the kind of concern expressed by Judith Ann Bayer of UTC: "If you're not part of the solution, your competition will fill the vacuum." Regardless of their reasons, the growing ranks of constructive business participants, along with other recent positive statements from the business community, added to a clear sense that momentum is shifting to a growing "just do it" caucus and away from the "just say no" crowd.
Of course, the latter group – exemplified by the Global Climate Coalition – were still in full presence in Buenos Aires. While they may try to portray COP-4 as a failure, the ship of their campaign has the distinct demeanor of taking on water. Their attacks on the science have failed, their core strategy of fomenting North-South polarization around the issue of developing country participation is crumbling, and key elements of their base constituency either have, or are considering, jumping ship. Their growing frustration, as well as that of their House and Senate champions, was on full display in Buenos Aires.
Land Use Change and Forestry (LUCF) Issues
In the closing sessions of the COP, the nations adopted a decision on LUCF issues (available at http://www.unfccc.de/fccc/docs/cop4/l05.htm) that usefully avoided premature exclusion of any LUCF options and essentially defers any final interpretations of definitions related to the domestic LUCF activities by industrialized countries – that is afforestation and reforestation – until the IPCC Special Report on LUCF issues is completed. (Recall that the IPCC was asked by nations in June, 1998 to complete an LUCF Special Report by mid-2000.)
Unfortunately, the COP decision makes no mention of a specific deadline for completion of the work. Without a firm schedule, countries that remain opposed to including some or all LUCF activities as an emissions mitigation option could make final decisions difficult to achieve. In plenary session, for example, Brazil expressed concern that the LUCF issue alone could undermine attainment of the Kyoto Protocol targets if the COP makes a wrong decision on forestry accounting. Strong efforts by countries and NGO's committed to developing an appropriate role for LUCF measures will be necessary to ensure that LUCF definitions are not delayed after IPCC finishes its work.
Also unfortunate was the decision's exclusive focus on LUCF activities in industrialized countries. Sources in the US delegation suggested that specific mention of the project work that might be initiated under the CDM or under Joint Implementation (JI) with the former Soviet and Eastern European nations was avoided because CDM discussions proved so contentious that trying to include project-specific language would have precluded any COP decision on LUCF at all. Given the current reluctance for discussion at the official level, the hostility of some environmental NGOs (notably the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace) to forest-based measures in general and the intention of the IPCC to limit analyses of project based activities to 10 pages in the Special Report, there is much work to be done to ensure a future appropriate role for forestry options under the CDM and JI.
However, in contrast to the official proceedings, a more positive momentum on LUCF issues was evident outside the plenary. In informal discussion and in the hallways, many delegates from developing countries expressed interest in LUCF projects and how their countries might benefit from their cobenefits in areas such as conserving biodiversity and reducing desertification. Much quality information was available to speak to their interest. The Nature Conservancy, the World Resources Institute and several Latin American NGOs presented informational seminars that were well-attended. In addition, several groups, including UCS, released new reports that highlighted the opportunities and discussed the challenges of LUCF projects.
Another event that highlighted the growing interest in LUCF issues was the 11th Session of the Global Biodiversity Forum convened by the IUCN – World Conservation Union, held midway through the COP. The theme of GBF-11 was "Exploring the linkages between the UN Conventions on Climate Change and Biological Diversity". Along with three other organizations, UCS led a workshop entitled "Forests in the Climate Change Agenda". The workshop brought together scientists and NGO's from the US, Europe and each tropical region to address the cross-cutting issues of forests, climate and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the experiences and technical and policy challenges associated with project-based forestry efforts (a summary of the workshop discussion is attached as an appendix to this report).
The LUCF side events in Buenos Aires made it clear that the NGO community is making an increasing effective contribution to the forestry debate. While the IPCC prepares the LUCF Special Report, there is an opportunity to engage and educate country delegates on the potential and the benefits of LUCF projects, reducing the risk that forestry will be dismissed out of hand in the policy realm. This outcome has so far been avoided and the continuing effort by UCS and others will mean that policymakers will be better positioned to make sound decisions when the IPCC report emerges in 2000.
Review of Commitments
The single biggest failure of COP-4 was on the review of adequacy of the industrialized country emissions goals set in the 1992 Rio treaty. Everyone agrees these goals are still inadequate, but they vigorously disagree on why. Developing countries say it is because industrialized countries aren’t doing enough to reduce their emissions to meet the Rio treaty targets. The US and some other industrialized countries say it’s because not enough countries are included in the Rio commitments. These countries note that without "meaningful participation" by key developing countries, it is impossible to achieve the treaty’s ultimate objective of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGes at safe levels.
The fact is, both sides are right. In the short term, industrialized countries must do much more to reduce their emissions; over the longer term, major developing countries must be included in the process. In Buenos Aires, neither side was willing to concede the truth of the other’s position. Thus, no agreement was reached and later COP meetings will have to set the schedule and parameters for future reviews, hopefully in a way that links the reviews to the science, in particular the periodic IPCC assessment reports.
Conclusion
COP-4 was marked by some unusually frank discussion among nations and some progress towards implementing the Kyoto Protocol was made. In particular, developing countries demonstrated a new willingness to consider meaningful participation in reducing global GHG emissions, and a realistic timetable was agreed upon for establishing rules for flexible mechanisms in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. Both these elements are key to the US and it signaled its continuing commitment to the Climate Convention process by signing the Kyoto Protocol.
It will be essential for the success of follow-on negotiations for the Administration to advance the specifics of US domestic action to reduce emissions, particularly in the key electricity and transportation sectors. If it hopes to achieve its goals on broader developing country participation and the flexibility mechanisms by COP-6, the US simply must do more to counter the growing impression that it intends to meet very little of its Kyoto commitment through action at home. The President should start by laying out his own domestic "plan of action" in his January State of the Union speech.
Although the COP avoided or deferred some of the hard decisions -– notably on flexible mechanisms and LUCF issues –- this was perhaps the preferable outcome to hasty decisions that would have compounded the problems of the Protocol’s ambiguous language. The bottom line is that despite the complexity of the process and the often-intense disagreements on specific issues, the Buenos Aires meeting accomplished its key objective of laying out the roadmap for the work ahead. The nations continued to move forward in the long-term journey of coming to grips with the threat of global warming.
by Darren Goetze, PhD
Acknowledgements
The contribution and review of Alden Meyer, UCS Director of Government Relations is gratefully acknowledged. Review and material were also provided by Peter Frumhoff, and Bud Ris.
Appendix
US Emissions Facts - Texas alone, with a population of 30 million, emits more CO2 than 93 developing countries added together, with a combined population nearly one billion people, and nearly 3 times as much CO2 as Brazil.
- Even Maine, the US' lowest emitting state, with a 2 million population, emits more CO2 than 41 developing countries combined, whose total population comes to 110 million.
- New York uses more gasoline in a week than the whole of Africa does in a year. Source: ECO (11 Nov 98)
Session of the IUCN Global Biodiversity Forum
Buenos Aires, Argentina
November 6-8, 1998
Report on the Forests and Climate Change Workshop
Co-sponsored by the Union of Concerned Scientists, World Resources Institute, Tata Energy Research Institute (India) and The Nature Conservancy
The participants in this workshop agreed that forest-based measures intended to mitigate climate change could provide significant biodiversity and socioeconomic cobenefits. However, this outcome is not assured. Done incorrectly, forest-based measures under the Kyoto Protocol could result in negative impacts on forest ecosystems, communities and the climate system. Participants discussed both general and specific approaches to address negative impacts and discussed the potential of forest measures in both industrialized and developing countries to link climate and biodiversity solutions. The following points do not reflect a consensus of participants. Rather, they are intended to capture the diverse perspectives of the presenters and discussants.
General - Forests are an important part of the problem and potentially an important part of the solution to both biodiversity loss and climate change.
- Forest-based measures to mitigate climate change should complement fossil-fuel based measures to reduce emissions.
- There is a need to improve GHG inventory methods to measure changes in all forest carbon stocks and land use change dynamics.
- Forest-based measures to reduce emissions can promote increases in technical capacity to monitor and understand forest ecosystems.
- The IPCC special report on land-use change and forestry should assess the biodiversity consequences of forest-based options for mitigating climate change under the Kyoto Protocol.
Forests, Biodiversity and the Kyoto Protocol - Decisions taken by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties regarding the role of land use change and forestry should take both climate and biodiversity issues into account.
- Decisions regarding land use change and forestry and their implementation should explicitly incorporate traditional knowledge, perspectives, and rights of indigenous peoples who live in forest regions.
- Parties to the Convention should develop clear guidelines to avoid adverse impacts of forest-based measures on biodiversity and the climate system.
- In particular, there is a need to avoid measures that replace natural forests with plantations, even if doing so produces a net reduction in GHG emissions.
Clean Development Mechanism - The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has the potential to facilitate forest-based projects that contribute to climate mitigation, biodiversity conservation and sustainable development.
- The CDM also has the potential to create incentives for land-use change that undermine achievement of these objectives, including the replacement of natural forests with plantations.
- Some current forest carbon offset projects can serve as important models to improve methods and build capacity to contribute to biodiversity and climate change solutions.
- Plantations as carbon offset projects should be designed to, at minimum, avoid negative impacts to biodiversity and support sustainable development.
- If a market for forest-based CDM projects develops, specific policies and incentives may be necessary to motivate projects that provide biodiversity and socio-economic co-benefits.
|
