

The Chinese Military Updates Chinese Nuclear Strategy: Translated Excerpts

The following excerpts are from a Chinese military text titled *The Science of Military Strategy*. The book was authored by the Strategic Research Department of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences and published in December 2013.

The full Chinese citation for the text is 战略学/军事学学院战略研究部编著. —北京: 军事科学出版社, 2013. 12

The excerpts were translated by Gregory Kulacki and are listed in the order they appear in the UCS white paper titled *The Chinese Military Updates Chinese Nuclear Strategy*. At the end of each translated excerpt is the page number where the original Chinese, listed below each translation, can be found in *The Science of Military Strategy*.

1. As it has been for a long time, the objective of China's development and utilization of nuclear weapons is concentrated on preventing enemy nations from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against us. (p. 172)

长期以来, 中国发展和运用核武器的目的, 集中在防止敌对国家对我使用或者威胁使用核武器上。

2. The directed nature of the target of deterrence. From the first day China possessed nuclear weapons it openly declared and committed not to use nuclear weapons, or threaten to use nuclear weapons, against non-nuclear weapons states or regions. This restricted the use of our country's nuclear weapons, and the target of nuclear deterrence, to nuclear-armed states. China's nuclear deterrent is only directed at nuclear-armed states; it is only in effect against nuclear weapons states. (p. 172)

威慑对象的针对性。中国从拥有核武器的第一天起就公开宣布和承诺, 不对无核武器国家和地区使用或者威胁使用核武器。这就将我国核力量运用、核威慑对象限制于有核武器国家。中国的核威慑只针对有核武器国家, 对有核武器国家才起作用。

3. Limited objective of deterrence. China's nuclear deterrent will not be used to deter non-nuclear enemy military activity and its effect in other non-nuclear military areas is also not evident. Strictly limiting the scope of the effect of nuclear deterrence to the hostile nuclear activities of nuclear-armed states makes the objective and the scope of the effect of China's nuclear deterrent progressively more focused. (p. 172)

威慑目的的有限性。中国的核威慑不会用于慑止非核的敌对军事行动, 在其他非核军事领域的作用也不明显。将核威慑的作用范

围局限于其他核国家的敌对核行动上，使中国的核威慑目的及作用范围进一步聚焦。

4. Defensive nature of the method of deterrence. China holds a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, only using nuclear weapons in self-defense after an enemy country uses nuclear weapons against us. Chinese nuclear deterrence is built on the foundation of effective retaliation, and through the actual strength as well as the possibility of creating for the enemy unbearable nuclear destruction, accomplish the objective of preventing an enemy nuclear attack. This is defensive nuclear deterrence. (p. 172)

威慑方式的防御性。中国奉行不首先使用核武器的政策，只有在敌对国家对我使用核武器之后，才运用核武器自卫。中国的核威慑建立在有效反击基础上，通过能够给敌方造成不可承受的核毁伤的实力以及可能性，达成慑止敌方核进攻的目的，是防御性的核威慑。

5. After the United States and the Soviet Union went through a nuclear arms race and reached a balance of nuclear terror, they could not but face the fact that a nuclear war has no winner, that it would create the cruel reality of 'nuclear winter' and that they must therefore make a new strategic choice to actively control the strategic motivations to use nuclear weapons, and switch to relying on fighting limited regional wars under the conditions of nuclear deterrence to obtain limited political war objectives. (p. 89)

美苏经过核军备竞赛达至核恐怖平衡之后，不得不面对核大战没有胜利者，并将造成“核冬天”的残酷现实而作出新的战略选择，主动控制使用核武器的战略冲动，转而依靠打核威慑背景下的有限局部战争，达成有限的战争政治目的。

6. On the question of nuclear deterrence, maintaining an appropriate degree of ambiguity, allowing opponents to guess about China's nuclear capability, the scale and timing of a Chinese nuclear retaliatory attack, etc. increases the degree of difficulty for the opponent's policy, helping raise the effective deterrent function of China's limited nuclear force. (p. 173)

在核威慑问题上保持适度模糊，让对方去猜测中国核实力、核反击时机和规模等，会增加对方决策的难度，有助于提升中国有限核力量的威慑效能。

7. There are in principle two target categories for a nuclear attack, military targets and urban targets. Politically, attacking military targets is comparatively more acceptable.

Militarily, it enables gaining the initiative, which is beneficial to controlling the war situation. But it requires comparatively high requirements for the number, precision and destructive function of nuclear weapons. In order to effectively destroy an opponent's nuclear forces a preemptive nuclear attack is generally required. This is the choice commonly pursued by large nuclear countries with aggressive nuclear strategies. Targeting cities can cause great damage to an enemy society and a large loss of life, which creates the effect of strong astonishment while having comparatively lower requirements for the scale of the force of a nuclear attack, the capabilities of nuclear weapons, the timing of a nuclear attack, etc. (p. 175)

核打击目标主要分成两类，即军事目标和城市目标。打击军事目标，在政治上会比较有利，在军事上能够争取主动，有利于控制战局，但对核武器数量、命中精度、毁伤效能等有较高要求。为了有效摧毁对方的核力量，往往需要实施先发制人的核打击，通常是奉行进攻性核战略的核强国的选择。打击城市目标，可以造成敌方社会的巨大破坏，人员的大量伤亡，产生强烈的震撼效果，同时对核打击力量规模、核武器性能、核打击时机等要求相对较低。

8. When carrying out a nuclear retaliatory attack, there is the need to create unendurable damage to the opponent, to frighten the opponent, while at the same time controlling the degree of the strength of retaliation, the pace and the scope of the target, where the goal is not to win a nuclear war, but to avoid a creating with an opponent the situation of a nuclear counterattack. (p. 176)

实施核反击时，既要能给对方造成不可承受的毁伤效果，震慑对方，同时也要控制反击强度、节奏和目标范围，不以打赢核战争为目的，避免与对方形成核对抗的局面。

9. When conditions are prepared and when necessary, we can, under conditions confirming the enemy has launched nuclear missiles against us, before the enemy nuclear warheads have reached their targets and effectively exploded, before they have caused us actual nuclear damage, quickly launch a nuclear missile retaliatory strike. This is in accord with our guiding policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and can effectively avoid having our nuclear forces suffer great losses, raising the ability of our nuclear missiles to survive and retaliate. (p. 175)

条件具备且必要时，可在确实判明敌已对我发射核导弹的情况下，在敌核弹头尚未飞抵目标有效爆炸，未对我造成实际核毁伤前，

快速发射核导弹反击。这样既符合我国不首先使用核武器的一贯政策，也能有效避免我核力量遭受更大损失，提高核导弹力量的生存反击能力。

10. On the one hand, nuclear arms control and disarmament has a positive effect on preserving strategic stability, preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, limiting the scale of nuclear war, reducing the destruction of nuclear war, reducing military expenditures, etc. These are the principal motivations behind and the reasons why worldwide nuclear arms control and disarmament continues to move forward. On the other hand, nuclear arms control and disarmament is also, especially to the large nuclear nations, an important means of fighting for and protecting nuclear superiority strategic superiority for limiting, weakening the nuclear capabilities of strategic opponents. (p. 176)

一方面，核军备控制与裁军，对维护战略稳定、防止核战争爆发、限制核战争规模、减小核战争毁伤、节约军费开支等，具有积极作用。这是世界范围核军备控制与裁军不断推进的主要动力和基本原因所在。另一方面，核军备控制与裁军也是核国家特别是核大国，争夺和维护自己的核优势和战略优势，限制、削弱其战略对手核能力的一种重要手段。

11. Select the style, methods, measures and tactics of the nuclear arms control and disarmament struggle according to the standard and requirements of protecting national security and development interests. (p. 177)

按照有利于维护国家安全和利益的标准和要求，选择和确定核军控与裁军斗争的方式、方法、步骤，策略。

12. Nuclear arms control and disarmament is an important trend in global military affairs, appropriate for this era, consistent with the objectives of China's nuclear policy and the development of China's nuclear weapons, and compatible with the overall requirement for national peace and development. We should energetically put forward the proper effort and take on the proper responsibility. (p. 177)

核军备控制与裁军，是世界核军事发展的重要方向，符合时代潮流，也与中国核政策及核武器发展目标一致，与国家和平发展的总体要求相契合。对于核军控与裁军，我要积极作出应有的努力，承担应有的责任。

13. At the same time, China's nuclear forces are relatively small and weak, China's nuclear foundation is comparatively fragile and the influence of nuclear arms control and disarmament on the nation's actual nuclear force is relatively clear. So when putting into practice concrete nuclear arms control and disarmament operations complete caution is required. If the time is not ripe, if conditions are not prepared, if we have an inaccurate grasp of the opponents' motives or the consequences of actions can not be estimated, we cannot act hastily. (p. 177-178)

同时，中国的核力量相对弱小，核基础比较薄弱，核军控与裁军对国家核实力影响比较明显，因而在核军控与裁军实践的具体操作上必须十分慎重，时机不成熟、条件不具备、对方动机把握不准或者行动后果难以预测时，不能贸然行事。

14. In the recent past, the present and for a period in the future, international nuclear arms control and disarmament is still a struggle between Russia and the United States, the countries with the most nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Actual nuclear strength is the foundation for conducting struggle in nuclear arms control and disarmament, and China's actual nuclear strength is still comparatively weak. The gap between the practical needs of protecting national security and the requirements of future military struggle is relatively large. We should develop to seek the initiative, grasp opportunities and lay a firm foundation for future participation in a realistic nuclear arms control and disarmament process, progressively striving to gain the initiative in the nuclear arms control and disarmament struggle. (p. 178)

当前和今后一个时期，国际核军控与裁军主要还是美俄两个装备最多核武器国家间的斗争。核实力是进行核军控与裁军斗争的基础，而中国核实力还比较弱，与维护国家安全的实际需要、未来军事斗争的要求有较大差距。我应以发展求主动，抓紧时机打牢未来参与实质性核军控与裁军进程的基础，逐步争取核军控与裁军斗争的主动。

15. In recent years, the nuclear security situation facing our country is, in general, trending towards complexity. First, the principal target of China's nuclear struggle is the nation with the strongest actual nuclear capability. The United States is making China its principal strategic opponent and is intensifying construction of a missile defense system in the East Asia region, creating increasingly serious effects on the reliability and effectiveness of a Chinese retaliatory nuclear attack. (p. 171)

近年来，我国面临的核安全形势总体上趋于复杂。一是中国核

斗争面对的主要对象是世界上核实力最强大的国家。美国将中国作为主要战略对手，加紧在东亚地区构建导弹防御系统，对中国实施核反击的可靠性和有效性构成日益严重的影响。

16. Against the background of continually expanding advantages in conventional military power and the accelerating construction of a global missile defense system, U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons is progressively being reduced through decreases in the number of nuclear weapons and limits on the scope of the roles played by nuclear weapons, etc. (p. 170-171)

美国在常规军事力量优势持续扩大，全球导弹防御系统加速构建的背景下，通过减少核武器数量、限制核武器发挥作用的范围等，进一步降低了对核武器的依赖。

17. The United States, while reducing its nuclear arsenal, is preserving, even accelerating, its ability, when needed, to rapidly increase its nuclear forces, and add to the manpower, technical resources and infrastructure of its actual nuclear strength. (p. 171)

美国在减少核武器数量的同时，保留甚至还加强了必要时能快速扩充核力量、增加核实力的人力，技术资源和基础设施。

18. The United States is currently putting into effect a plan for a conventional “rapid global strike” which, as soon as it becomes an actual combat capability, used to carry out a conventional attack against our nuclear missile forces, will put us in a passive position, greatly influencing our nuclear retaliatory capability, weakening the effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. (p. 171)

美国正在实施常规“快速全球打击”计划，一旦形成实战能力，用于对我导弹核力量实施常规打击，将使我处于被动地位，大大影响我核反击能力，削弱我核威慑效能。

19. The United States is strengthening traditional military alliance relationships and establishing new strategic partnership relations with the aim of building around the land mass of Asia a massive naval alliance system to realize the strategic need to contain China’s rise. (p. 73)

美国在加强传统的军事同盟关系，建立新的战略伙伴关系，企图

在亚洲大陆边疆建立庞大的海洋联盟体系，以实现遏制中国崛起战略需要。

20. While promoting the reduced role of nuclear weapons, it stresses continuing to preserve U.S. nuclear superiority. While consolidating and expanding superiority in conventional weapons, it is expending great energy developing space, cyber and other new types of war-fighting forces. (p. 52)

在主张降低核武器作用的同时，强调继续保持美国核优势。在巩固和扩大常规力量的同时大力发展太空，网络等新型作战力量。

21. For the present, the construction and development of nuclear forces should be centered on raising the informational technology of nuclear weapons systems, strengthening command and control, constructing strategic early warning and rapid response capability, continuously enhancing penetration capability under informationalized conditions, protection and survival capabilities, rapid response capability, mobility, etc. actively raising the credibility of nuclear deterrence. (p. 148)

当前，核力量的建设与发展，应以提高核武器系统信息化水平为核心，加强指挥控制，战略预警和快速反应能力建设，不断增强信息化条件下的突防能力，防护生存能力，快速反应能力和机动能力等，努力提高核威慑的可信度。